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Kaplan, E.A. Emotions in Far-Right Mainstreaming. Encyclopedia. Available online: https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/61749 (accessed on 18 November 2026).
Kaplan EA. Emotions in Far-Right Mainstreaming. Encyclopedia. Available at: https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/61749. Accessed November 18, 2026.
Kaplan, Elif Asude. "Emotions in Far-Right Mainstreaming" Encyclopedia, https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/61749 (accessed November 18, 2026).
Kaplan, E.A. (2026, November 02). Emotions in Far-Right Mainstreaming. In Encyclopedia. https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/61749
Kaplan, Elif Asude. "Emotions in Far-Right Mainstreaming." Encyclopedia. Web. 02 November, 2026.

Emotions in Far-Right Mainstreaming

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Emotions in far-right mainstreaming refers to the role of emotions such as anger, fear, and resentment in the increasing visibility and normalization of far-right ideas in mainstream political discourse. These emotions can contribute to political mobilization, while mass media and periods of crisis can create opportunities for far-right ideas to reach wider public debates.

Far-right mainstreaming Political emotions Populism Nativism Political mobilization Political discourse

1. Emotions in Far-Right Mainstreaming

Why do we hear so much more about immigrants in daily news today than we did before? The main answer to this question is that far-right rhetoric, which usually revolves around nationalism, nativism, and immigration, is not only being employed by far-right actors but also by mainstream political parties and leaders. Although nativism and anti-immigrant sentiments, most prominently Islamophobia in contemporary European politics, were usually considered to belong to the political fringes, they are now also being employed by other political parties as a way to gain more votes.

2. Far-Right Mainstreaming

In the simplest sense, the far-right is an umbrella term referring to political groups or parties that propose nationalist solutions to a broad range of socio-economic problems [1]. However, the far-right has changed its focus over the years. The main components of this ideology today include national sovereignty, skepticism of supranational institutions, often anti-elitism, and strict positions on immigration [1]. One of its key elements is the utilization of civic nationalism to promote anti-immigrant stances [1].

The far-right has come in waves in politics. The third wave, according to Mudde [2], was a shifting point in the post-war period, roughly between the 1980s and the 2000s. This was a time when far-right parties were considered to be in the political margins, although there were examples of electoral success. The fourth wave, after the 2000s, however, is not limited to the margins or to far-right parties. In today's political environment, far-right ideas have become increasingly normalized and mainstreamed.

Mass media plays a significant role in increasing the legitimacy of far-right issues and frames through discursive mainstreaming. In this context, discursive mainstreaming refers to the incremental process of far-right ideas gaining visibility in the public sphere [3]. In Europe, far-right actors have been successful in using political agendas to push their ideological positions and policies on topics such as the refugee crisis and the Covid-19 crisis [3].

However, it is important to mention that the mainstreaming of the far-right does not occur in a vacuum. For any political idea that was considered to be on the fringes to go mainstream, it needs to gain visibility in public debates. This can be understood through discursive fields, which are dynamic arenas of public debate that define what is to be discussed [4]. Although these fields are dynamic, discourses take time to gain importance within the public.

One argument is that discursive fields go through drastic changes in unsettling times, which are moments in history when large-scale crises lead to cultural change [4]. Because of uncertainty, in unsettling times, fringe organizations, including the far-right, have more opportunities to express their usually unpopular opinions to the public, and mainstream actors may become more open to hearing them. Fringe organizations can gain increased media representation following unsettling times, such as the 9/11 attacks, global pandemics, or refugee crises.

Another layer of far-right mainstreaming is the diffusion of far-right ideas into various spheres of society. With the increased usage of nativist and exclusionary positions in the media and political debates, the public starts to pay more attention to these arguments and normalize them. What used to be considered radical or extreme may become normalized and part of everyday political life [3]. Today, discourses of nationalism, racism, and anti-Semitism have contributed to the normalization of exclusion [3].

2. Emotions and Political Mobilization

To further understand the mainstreaming of far-right ideas, it is important to look at the emotions that the far-right creates in and/or draws from people. In the most concise way, far-right ideas, such as anti-migration positions and Islamophobia, create and/or are driven by anger, resentment, and fear among parts of the population. These emotions are strong driving forces in shaping how the electorate votes.

One explanation for this relationship is how far-right parties capitalize on both economic and cultural insecurities by using civic nationalist rhetoric [1]. In an already polarized political arena, mainstream parties, as well as far-right parties, may use far-right rhetoric to compete for the electorate [3]. The success of the far-right is therefore not only dependent on individual feelings or macrostructural changes. Far-right actors can also be successful because they are able to exploit negative emotions provoked by these macrostructures [5]. The far-right uses emotions to a significant degree, but the key point is that these feelings are not experienced in isolation. As Leser and Spissinger argue, feelings are not only personal or subjective but are also political [6]. The emotions associated with far-right political discourse are often negative, such as anger, resentment, and sometimes even hate.

However, these emotions are rarely experienced one at a time. They are often combined with other feelings and perceptions. One of the most significant experiences associated with anger is relative deprivation. Relative deprivation refers to the perception that one's own group is disadvantaged compared to another [5]. This deprivation is perceived, just as threats can be perceived. Additionally, research has shown that relative deprivation is not only about economic conditions; it is closely linked to social and cultural deprivation and grievances about life chances [5].

3. Beyond Negative Emotions

However, the far-right does not rely only on negative discourse. Although the far-right uses feelings of anger and resentment as a response to modernity, it still uses many of modernity's main pillars to criticize others. Far-right actors can also express anti-Muslim positions through rationality and the language of political liberalism [7]. This is done by using the parts of liberal democratic discourse that are useful for far-right rhetoric while still excluding those who are perceived to be outside these norms. In this framing, Islam is presented as a perceived threat to society, and this fear can be expressed through rational and factual language rather than openly hostile discourse [7].

Together with feelings of anger and fear and this use of liberal democratic discourse, the far-right proposes that its actors are the only ones who can hear the worries of the people and the only ones capable of solving the created problem or perceived threat. In an already pluralized political environment, they present themselves as defenders of the nation and connect political issues, such as Islam, immigration, and international organizations, with their ideological goals of nativism, racism, anti-elitism, and anti-pluralism [3]. In these political groups, legitimacy is closely dependent on emotions and identification [8].

4. Conclusion

To sum up, far-right mainstreaming is not only about the increased visibility of far-right actors, but also about the normalization of their ideas in daily politics. As discussed above, mass media and unsettling times can create opportunities for far-right discourse to reach the public. At the same time, emotions such as anger, fear, and resentment can contribute to political mobilization. Together, these processes help explain how far-right rhetoric moves from the fringes to mainstream political debates.

References

  1. Halikiopoulou, D.; Vlandas, T. . , , . What is new and what is nationalist about Europe's new nationalism? Explaining the rise of the far right in Europe. Nations and Nationalism 2019, 25(2), 409–434. [CrossRef]
  2. Mudde, C. . The Far Right Today; Polity Press: Cambridge, UK, 2019.
  3. Saldivia Gonzatti, D.; Völker, T. Far-right agenda setting: How the far right influences the political mainstream. European Journal of Political Research 2026, 65(1), 101–123. [CrossRef]
  4. Bail, C.A. The fringe effect: Civil society organizations and the evolution of media discourse about Islam since the September 11th attacks. American Sociological Review 2012, 77(6), 855–879.. [CrossRef]
  5. Betz, H.-G.; Oswald, M. . Emotional mobilization: The affective underpinnings of right-wing populist party support. In The Palgrave Handbook of Populism; Oswald, M., Eds.; Palgrave Macmillan: Cham, Switzerland, 2022; pp. 115–143. [CrossRef]
  6. Leser, J.; Spissinger, F. . The functionality of affects: Conceptualising far-right populist politics beyond negative emotions. In The Politics of Negative Emotions; Degerman, D., Eds.; Bristol University Press: Bristol, UK, 2023; pp. 156–176. [CrossRef]
  7. Diefenbach, A. . Zur rationalisierten Affektpolitik der ›Islamisierung‹ am Beispiel rechtsextremer Basisaktivisten. In Islam in Europa: Institutionalisierung und Konflikt; Wohlrab-Sahr, M., Tezcan, L., Eds.; Nomos: Baden-Baden, Germany, 2022; pp. 270–302. [CrossRef]
  8. Wodak, R. . Entering the 'post-shame era': The rise of illiberal democracy, populism and neo-authoritarianism in EUrope. In The Limits of EUrope: Identities, Spaces, Values; Foster, R., Grzymski, J., Eds.; Bristol University Press: Bristol, UK, 2022; pp. 207–227. [CrossRef]
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Subjects: Political Science
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