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Da Silva, S. System 1 vs. System 2 Thinking. Encyclopedia. Available online: https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/50203 (accessed on 06 July 2024).
Da Silva S. System 1 vs. System 2 Thinking. Encyclopedia. Available at: https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/50203. Accessed July 06, 2024.
Da Silva, Sergio. "System 1 vs. System 2 Thinking" Encyclopedia, https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/50203 (accessed July 06, 2024).
Da Silva, S. (2023, October 12). System 1 vs. System 2 Thinking. In Encyclopedia. https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/50203
Da Silva, Sergio. "System 1 vs. System 2 Thinking." Encyclopedia. Web. 12 October, 2023.
System 1 vs. System 2 Thinking
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This entry is adapted from the peer-reviewed paper 10.3390/psych5040071

While the majority of cognitive psychologists now embrace the dual-processing theory of the mind, Systems 1 and 2, there are still some who disagree. Most evolutionary psychologists, in contrast, dispute the existence of System 2, a domain-general mind, although some disagree. However, a consensus is growing in favor of System 2, although evolutionary psychologists’ concerns must be addressed.

dual-processing theory of the mind systems 1 and 2 cognitive psychologists evolutionary psychologists

1. Introduction

It is widely accepted that the human mind is specialized for specific domains. But is there a domain-general mind? Cognitive psychologists concur; however, evolutionary psychologists find this notion too pricy to accept. The specialization of different cognitive processes to handle specific types of information or tasks makes the mind domain specific. This means that the mind is not a single, general-purpose processor capable of handling all types of information equally well, but rather a collection of specialized modules, each optimized for a specific type of information or task.
Most cognitive psychologists now accept the dual-processing theory of the mind, which states that the mind operates in two separate but interconnected systems: the automatic system and the controlled system. The automatic system is a collection of subsystems known as System 1. It is fast, intuitive, and works unconsciously. It is responsible for processing information that is readily available in our memory and has been repeated several times. This system is in charge of our first reactions to situations and emotions. In contrast, the controlled system, or System 2, is slower and more deliberate. It is in charge of conscious thought, reasoning, problem solving, and decision making. This system is more adaptable and flexible, allowing us to override our initial reactions and critically evaluate information. System 1 is often referred to as the “gut feeling” mode of thought because it relies on mental shortcuts known as heuristics to make decisions quickly and efficiently. When the information presented is new, complex, or requires conscious thought, System 2 is used. It is frequently referred to as the “thinking” mode of thought because it relies on effortful processing to reach a conclusion.
Both systems collaborate to help us process information and make decisions, but which system is used depends on the situation and type of information being processed.

2. Attack of Evolutionary Psychologists

Mainstream cognitive psychology is founded on a number of fundamental assumptions that evolutionary psychology challenges. Cognitive psychologists believe that cognitive architecture is all-purpose and devoid of content [1]. For example, information processing devices responsible for food choice would be the same as for mate and habitat choice. The capacity for reasoning, learning, imitation, goal-oriented actions, recognizing similarities, conceptualizing, and memory retention exemplify general-purpose mechanisms.
Conversely, most evolutionary psychologists hold the opposing viewpoint: the mind comprises numerous specialized mechanisms, each finely tuned to address distinct problems [2]. This modularity explains why people have different cognitive strengths and weaknesses, and why some people are better than others at certain types of processing. Modular processes are fast, mandatory, domain specific, informationally encapsulated, cognitively impenetrable, facilitated by specific neural architecture, susceptible to idiosyncratic pathological breakdown, and of fixed developmental sequence [3][4]. Modularity enables faster processing and greater accuracy in specific domains and provides a parsimonious explanation of cognitive processes by implying that different types of processing can be accounted for by different specialized modules rather than a single domain-general mechanism. Seminal works on modularity are [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11].
Given that cognitive psychology views the mind as a versatile information-processing tool, limited consideration is directed towards the selection of stimuli for cognitive experiments. Frequently, cognitive psychologists choose stimuli primarily based on their ease of presentation and experimental control. Triangles, squares, and circles are used in studies rather than natural categories such as relatives, partners, enemies, or edible objects. Because artificial stimuli lack “content”, they are preferred.
According to evolutionary psychologists, another core presumption of cognitive psychology is “functional agnosticism”, asserting that the study of information processing mechanisms can occur without a full grasp of the specific adaptive issues they evolved to address. Ultimate (functional) explanations supplement purely proximate (causal) explanations by framing them in terms of survival value or function. Why does that bird sing so much more in the spring? The proximate explanation is that longer days cause hormonal changes, whereas the ultimate explanation is that it attracts breeding partners. The goal of evolutionary psychology is to find ultimate explanations for the study of human cognition [2]. 
Most cognitive psychologists, in contrast, accept the hypothesis of domain-general cognitive mechanisms, which stem from the behaviorists’ domain-general learning process [6][12]. One flaw in this hypothesis is that it ignores the existence of information sets that cognitive mechanisms have been specifically designed by evolution to process. A computer is also a domain-general information processor, but without “combinatorial explosion” issues. If the mind were a domain-general program with no processing rules, it would be confronted with a dizzying array of options.
Cognitive psychology will always be rooted in computational theories [13]. A computational theory defines a problem as well as the mechanism for solving it. This means that it specifies the information processing mechanism’s function [1]. The foundational principles of computational theory include: (1) Problem solving involves information processing mechanisms. (2) These mechanisms solve problems by considering their inherent structure. (3) To elucidate a mechanism’s structure, comprehension of the problem it was designed to solve and its purpose is essential. However, computational theory on its own does not outline how a mechanism resolves an adaptive problem, as each problem possesses multiple potential solutions.
Computational theories do not negate the requirement for scientific experiments to test hypotheses about problem-solving strategies in organisms. Instead, they narrow down the possibilities by outlining what is necessary for a successful solution. This process allows computational theories to eliminate many non-viable solutions for an adaptive problem. An important constraint for evolutionary psychologists is that information pertinent to solving human adaptive problems must have been recurrently present in ancestral environments. Consequently, humans (and possibly other species as well [14]) possess numerous specialized psychological mechanisms, each dedicated to addressing specific adaptive challenges [2].
Examples of these general systems include general intelligence, concept creation, analogical reasoning, working memory, and classical conditioning. Working memory is the portion of short-term memory that pertains to conscious perceptual and verbal processing occurring in the present moment. Classical (Pavlovian) conditioning refers to association-based learning. General intelligence is the fluid capacity to integrate multiple cognitive abilities in order to tackle a novel problem. Evolutionary psychologists who recognize domain-general mechanisms contend that while recurring features of adaptive challenges lead to specialized adaptations, humans encountered numerous novel problems without frequent recurrence for dedicated adaptations to develop.
One instance illustrating the interplay between domain-specific and domain-general processes is found in Baddeley and Hitch’s working memory model. This model underscores the significance of temporarily storing and manipulating information for cognitive tasks. While the model primarily centers on the central executive and the phonological loop, it also introduces the notion of domain-specific “slave systems”, such as the visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological store. This situation presents a notable tension between the concept of distinct sensory modules and the assumption of universal computational operations in working memory, often rooted in learning mechanisms such as Hebbian plasticity (the process through which information is encoded and retained in neurons in the brain) and long-term potentiation (the strengthening of synapses resulting in a lasting enhancement of signal transmission between neurons).
Within the realm of working memory, Baddeley and Hitch’s model does imply a degree of domain specificity through its separate slave systems catering to different types of information. Nevertheless, the central executive component, responsible for directing attention and manipulating information, is commonly viewed as more domain-general in nature.
Despite these arguments, most evolutionary psychologists are skeptical that domain-general mechanisms evolved. General intelligence could potentially represent a domain-specific adaptation targeting a particular category of challenges—specifically, those that are evolutionarily unprecedented [15]. Demonstrating proficiency in evolutionarily novel activities such as using the Internet or driving a car does not necessarily indicate domain-general adaptations.
In summary, within the realm of evolutionary psychology, it remains premature to definitively conclude whether humans possess domain-general mechanisms alongside the established domain-specific mechanisms. But one thing is certain: the domain-specific mind assumption has been successfully used to discover important mechanisms, and it remains to be seen whether the domain-general mind assumption will yield comparable empirical discoveries [2]. But another thing is certain too: the human mind cannot have separate and isolated mechanisms.

3. Cognitive Psychologists Fight Back

Keith Stanovich [16] summarizes cognitive psychologists’ responses to the fundamental criticisms of evolutionary psychologists. As previously stated, the majority of evolutionary psychologists deny the existence of domain-general processing mechanisms. As a result, they accept the modularity hypothesis. However, the majority of cognitive psychologists are opposed to modularity [17][18][19]. System 2 is the term cognitive psychologists use to describe domain-general processing mechanisms, as seen. System 1, also known as TASS (The Autonomous Set of Systems), is the term for domain-specific processing. In terms of genes, System 1 maximizes inclusive fitness, which is an indicator of an individual’s overall contribution to the next generation, accounting for both its own offspring and the offspring of its relatives. Based on the individual’s ultimate goals, System 2 calculates utility maximizing actions. Analytical processing is required for an individual to maximize their utility in situations other than those found in evolutionary adaptation environments. This necessitates System 2 overriding System 1 [16].
According to cognitive psychologists [16], the evolutionary psychologists’ adaptationist approach focuses on functional dimensions and minimizes individual differences among humans caused by genetic variability, which would be functionally superficial [6]. As a result, they regard general intelligence and other inherited personality traits as functionally secondary. The issue is that general intelligence and other personality traits are essential for maximizing personal utility, which includes the pursuit of status.
Cognitive psychologists observe that evolutionary psychologists often downplay the impacts of discrepancies between the environment of evolutionary adaptations and the present-day environment. There would not have been much of a difference between then and now. Nonetheless, there are unnatural pressures for decontextualization in the modern world. Conflicts between System 1 and System 2 result from this, as demonstrated by Kahneman and Tversky’s agenda of heuristics and biases [20]. The settings in which System 1 performs best—frequently rehearsed, frequency-coded, time-constrained, recognition-based decisions—do not always exist in the modern world. Representativeness, availability, sunk cost, confirmation biases, overconfidence, and other consequences that hinder an individual’s capacity to maximize utility result from the conflict between System 1 and System 2.
Cognitive illusions, for example, arise when confronted with probability representations other than the frequentist one. For example, “40 people out of 1000 have symptoms”, rather than “4% have symptoms”, is more understandable. However, the frequentist representation does not eliminate the cognitive bias any more than the Muller-Lyar visual illusion is eliminated after we “learn” to see it. Lines with arrow-like tails are used in the Muller-Lyar illusion, with one line having inward-facing tails and the other having outward-facing tails. The line with inwardly pointing tails appears shorter, while the line with outwardly pointing tails appears longer.
Cognitive biases are systematic errors in thinking that can lead to incorrect judgments and choices. In the dual-processing theory of the mind, cognitive biases are often associated with System 1 thinking. System 1 makes decisions quickly and efficiently using heuristics, which are simple rules of thumb, but this can lead to systematic biases. In contrast, System 2 thinking is thought to be less prone to biases because it is more likely to engage in critical evaluation of information, consider multiple perspectives, and weigh the evidence carefully. In practice, however, it is not always the case that System 2 thinking is free from biases, and many biases can persist even when we are engaging in more deliberate and reflective thinking. For example, memes are another source of persistence of bias in System 2 thinking.
Contrary to the heuristics and biases approach, some cognitive psychologists agree with evolutionary psychologists who do not recognize System 2. Earlier frequentist representations were shown to remove cognitive biases in non-frequentist probability format experiments [21]. System 1 understands frequentist representation but not non-frequentist representations such as Bayesian probability. However, many frequentist versions of base-rate problems are computationally simpler and thus cannot be directly compared to the non-frequentist version [22][23]. The System 1 heuristics, developed for the Pleistocene era, are not suited for attaining rationality in the contemporary world.
Evolution by natural and sexual selection, according to evolutionary psychologists, built the human mind’s decision-making machinery, and this set of cognitive devices defines and constitutes the universal human principles that guide decision making. Therefore, evolutionary psychology ought to furnish a compilation of universally shared human preferences, along with methodologies for obtaining and rearranging supplementary preferences [24]. Cognitive psychologists do not deny this, but they caution against ignoring the role of culture in determining human preferences. However, culture has evolutionary roots as well. Slow biological evolution has given way to rapid cultural evolution. 

4. The Reasserted Point of View of Cognitive Psychologists

Evidence from experimental psychology and neuroscience, according to cognitive psychologists, points to the existence of two minds in the brain [25][26]. This has nothing to do with the dualism mind–brain, as the mind can still be considered simply as brain activity [27]. Two systems compete to influence our perceptions and actions. System 1 is an ancient evolutionary mechanism shared with other animals. Its subsystems comprise innate input modules and domain-specific knowledge acquired through a domain-general learning mechanism. On the other hand, System 2 is a recent evolutionary development that is distinctly human. It facilitates abstract reasoning and hypothesis-driven thinking. System 2 correlates with general intelligence measures.
A classic experiment to study attention is the Stroop task, which shows the conflict between automatic System 1 and controlled processing System 2 thinking. It is the most straightforward evidence for the existence of the two systems. Participants are given a list of words that are printed in various colors. The task is to identify the color of the ink used to print the word while ignoring the word itself. The task is made more difficult by presenting incongruent stimuli, such as words printed in different colors of ink, such as “blue” printed in red ink. Participants encounter a conflict between a task they intend to complete using System 2 and an automatic response from System 1 that interferes with it. That is, System 2 is in charge of self-control [28]. It is difficult to break the habit of responding to the color in the Stroop task after years of learning to read words. When participants succeed, however, they increase activity in the areas of the cortex responsible for color vision while decreasing activity in the areas responsible for word identification [27].
According to cognitive psychologists, there is also evidence of dual-process reasoning in tasks exhibiting the belief bias effect [29]. In these tasks, participants attempt to reason logically according to the instructions, but prior beliefs interfere with the answers provided. There are four types of syllogisms: (1) a legitimate argument and a credible conclusion (absence of conflict); (2) a legitimate argument and an unbelievable conclusion (presence of conflict); (3) an illegitimate argument and a credible conclusion (presence of conflict); and (4) an illegitimate argument and an unbelievable conclusion (no conflict). When accepting or rejecting the conclusions of these syllogisms, the belief bias effect appears. Participants are more likely to accept a conclusion if it stands on its own merits. The belief bias effect makes it difficult to deduce the conclusion logically from the premises. Cognitive psychologists believe that this indicates that System 2 is having difficulty removing the belief suggested by System 1.
Cognitive psychologists also find evidence from neuroscience for the dual-reasoning process. Though neither system has a single location in the brain [28], in brain images taken by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), there is evidence of neural differentiation of reasoning with abstract material and with material that uses semantic-rich problems [30]. Content-based reasoning engages the left hemisphere’s temporal lobe, while abstract formal problem solving triggers activity in the parietal lobe. Commonly shared neural regions include the bilateral basal ganglia nucleus, the right cerebellum, the fusiform gyrus, and the left prefrontal cortex. For syllogistic reasoning, two distinct regions are involved. In tasks inducing the belief bias effect, Goel and Dolan [31] utilized fMRI. In syllogism tasks where participants make logically correct decisions, the right inferior prefrontal cortex activates.
Cognitive psychologists see the correspondence bias, which can be seen in the Wason selection task, as additional evidence that mental processes are dual. Wason [32] wanted to know if people can be Popperian: if they are well equipped to test hypotheses in everyday life by looking for evidence that potentially falsifies them. The Wason selection task evaluates the potential violation of the conditional hypothesis “if P then Q” across four distinct situations, each illustrated using a set of four cards. When P is true but Q is false, an assumption of the form “if P then Q” is violated.
The correspondence bias is a System 1 heuristic. Humans are not born with the ability to detect violations of descriptive or causal rules. The brain evolved to aid in survival and reproduction, not to uncover the truth. When social contracts are involved, however, performance on the Wason selection task improves [33]. Applying the identical format as the earlier abstract example, wherein the statement is “If a person is drinking beer, that person must be over the age of 18”, the correct P and not Q cards—namely, “drinking beer” and “16 years old”—are reversed on more than 70% of occasions. According to cognitive psychologists, there is evidence in neuroscience that the correspondence bias reflects the existence of two minds. Those who successfully overcome the bias activate distinct brain regions [34].
Lastly, cognitive psychologists highlight archaeological findings indicating that humans developed System 2, meant for domain-general reasoning, subsequent to the existence of autonomous subsystems (System 1). Notably, approximately 50,000 years ago, there was a sudden rise in representational art and religious imagery, along with swift transformations in instrument and artifact design [35].
However, the dual-mind idea contradicts evolutionary psychologists’ focus on the mind’s massive modularity, even when engaged in domain-general reasoning, and the fact that domain-specific mechanisms make more evolutionary sense than domain-general reasoning abilities. The potential late evolution of System 2 implies differentiating between evolutionary rationality (the logic of System 1) and individual rationality (the logic of System 2) [36]. With less direct genetic influence, System 2 enables humans to follow their own goals rather than those of their genes [16].

5. The View of Dissident Cognitive Psychologists

At this point, it is clear that most cognitive psychologists agree that there are two distinct mental processes known as System 1 and System 2, and that some evolutionary psychologists are starting to accept the two-mind theory as well [2]. However, a small group of cognitive psychologists, dubbed “ecological theorists” by their colleagues, agree with the still dominant view among evolutionary psychologists that denies the existence of domain-general mental processes (System 2).
According to these ecological theorists, intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles [37][38][39]. They contend that the evidence supporting the dual theory is consistent with a single system theory [37]. Moreover, they contend that the theories of the two systems lack clear conceptual definitions, rest on questionable methodologies, and depend on insufficient and often inadequate empirical support [38]. They claim that dual-reasoning process theories demonstrate the retrocession of precise theories to substitutes [40]. Additionally, they provide reasoning and empirical substantiation in favor of a rule-based theoretical framework. This framework elucidates both intuitive and thoughtful judgments while challenging the notion of dual systems characterized by qualitatively distinct processes [39].
In the perspective of ecological theorists [39], rules serve as inferential tools for tasks such as categorization, estimation, pairwise comparisons, and judgment, extending beyond provided information. A rule takes the form of an if–then relation, akin to syllogistic reasoning: if (clues), then (judgment). Consequently, rule-based judgments follow a deductive approach. Notably, the same rules can underlie both intuitive and deliberate judgments. The accuracy of both types hinges on how well the rules align with the environment—an ecological rationality of rules. Thus, intuitive and deliberative judgments are both rooted in rules. These rules may adopt either an optimizing or heuristic nature. Nonetheless, a challenge arises in selecting appropriate rules for such judgments.
How do individuals choose a rule from their adaptive repertoire for a specific problem? This choice is bound by the task and memory content, narrowing down the viable rules. The ultimate selection of a rule, however, rests on processing capacity and perceived ecological rationality. When multiple rules possess similar ecological rationales, a rule conflict can emerge. The proper implementation of a specific rule might face interference from competing rules. These rules are rooted in fundamental cognitive abilities, such as recognition memory. Variations in these abilities among individuals impact how swiftly and accurately a rule is executed. Rules, which encompass both intuitive heuristics founded on stereotypes and deliberative logic-based rules, can exhibit varying degrees of ease or difficulty in application. This depends on their level of routine integration and their immediate accessibility. Individuals endowed with higher processing capabilities adeptly employ both easy and challenging rules, guided by their perceived ecological rationality.
Nothing is more intuitive and automatic than visual illusions. For ecological theorists, even the most basic perceptual judgments are rule-based. A figure with dots on the left that appear concave and those on the right that appear convex inverts after turning the figure upside down is an example of one of these illusions. This arises from the brain’s creation of a three-dimensional mental model, utilizing shaded parts of dots to speculate about the dots’ extension in the third dimension. In forming this speculation, the brain relies on two assumptions: (1) that light originates from above (in relation to retinal coordinates); and (2) that a single light source exists. Consequently, the visual illusion is founded on an inferential rule that hinges on these two environmental attributes [41]. In times when the sole light sources were the sun or moon, the brain adhered to a straightforward guideline: dots with shadows on top were perceived as receding into the surface, while those with shadows on the bottom were interpreted as protruding from the surface.
Ecological theorists emphasize ten adaptive toolbox heuristics that underpin both intuitive and deliberate judgments: (1) recognition [42], which establishes that if one of two alternatives is recognized, you should deduce that it is the most important; (2) fluency [43][44] asserts that if you identify two choices, but one stands out as being recognized more swiftly, you can infer that it holds greater significance; (3) choose the best [45], which states that you should first look for clues in expiration order, then stop looking for a track that is recognized, and finally choose the alternative that this track suggests; (4) tallying [46], which states that when estimating a criterion, you should ignore weights and simply count the number of positive clues; (5) satisficing [47][48], which refers to searching for alternatives and selecting the first that meets or exceeds your aspiration level; (6) equality [49], which states that resources must be allocated equally to each of n alternatives; (7) default [50][51], which states that if a default occurs, nothing should be done; (8) tit-for-tat [52], which refers to cooperating first and then imitating the other’s behavior; (9) imitate the majority [53], which refers to imitating the majority of your group’s behavior; and (10) imitate the successful [53], which establishes that you should mimic the most successful individual’s behavior.

6. Summary

Most cognitive psychologists agree that there are two mental processes, which Daniel Kahneman popularized as System 1 and System 2. These two systems compete for dominance over our inferences and actions. In evolutionary terms, System 1 predates the other and comprises a self-contained assembly of autonomous subsystems. System 2 enables abstract reasoning as well as the use of hypotheses. System 2 is thus a domain-general processing mechanism. Domain-specific processing mechanisms refer to System 1. The late evolution of System 2 suggests that a distinction be made between evolutionary rationality, which is System 1’s logic, and individual rationality, which is System 2’s logic. As a result of the emergence of System 2, humans can pursue their own goals rather than just the goals of genes.
Most evolutionary psychologists, however, deny the existence of a domain-general processing mechanism (System 2) and only accept the modularity of mind hypothesis. A minority of cognitive psychologists support this view and believe that intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on shared principles. While most evolutionary psychologists disagree with the notion that cognitive architecture is domain-general and devoid of content, some evolutionary psychologists are beginning to accept the theory of the two minds.
Even though recurrent features of adaptive challenges favor specialized adaptations, evolutionary psychologists assert that humans encountered numerous novel problems lacking sufficient regularity for specific adaptations to evolve. Therefore, prematurely assuming the existence of a domain-general processing mechanism alongside established domain-specific processing mechanisms is cautioned against by these psychologists. After all, the domain-specific mind assumption has been used successfully to discover important mechanisms, and it remains to be seen whether the domain-general mind assumption will yield comparable empirical results.
However, the human mind cannot have separate and isolated mechanisms because certain mechanisms’ data provide information to others. Internal data such as sight, smell, and hunger provide information that can be used to determine whether a food is edible. There is no information encapsulation in the adapted psychological mechanisms, and thus no modularity. This is due to the fact that information encapsulation would imply that psychological mechanisms would only have access to independent information and would not have access to information from other psychological mechanisms. There must also be supermechanisms, such as daemons, that specialize in ordering and regulating other mechanisms.
Analytical processing is required in situations other than those found in evolutionary adaptation environments, and this necessitates System 2 overriding System 1. A large number of cognitive biases emerge from the conflict between System 1 and System 2, as studied in Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s heuristics and biases agenda. These biases interfere with an individual’s ability to maximize utility. According to cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists are incorrect in assuming that System 1 heuristics, which were adapted to the Pleistocene, are optimized for making sound decisions in the modern world.
Nudges are a method for influencing System 1 thinking. However, despite their effectiveness in influencing behavior, nudges can sometimes be controversial. In addition, because memes can contaminate System 2 thinking, poor judgment and decision making are not solely the product of System 1 dominating System 2 thinking—a circumstance that nudges cannot influence.

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Subjects: Psychology
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Sergio Da Silva
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