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Yang, T.; Li, C.; Bian, Z. Recycling Strategies in a Collector-Led Remanufacturing Supply Chain. Encyclopedia. Available online: (accessed on 17 June 2024).
Yang T, Li C, Bian Z. Recycling Strategies in a Collector-Led Remanufacturing Supply Chain. Encyclopedia. Available at: Accessed June 17, 2024.
Yang, Tianjian, Chunmei Li, Zijing Bian. "Recycling Strategies in a Collector-Led Remanufacturing Supply Chain" Encyclopedia, (accessed June 17, 2024).
Yang, T., Li, C., & Bian, Z. (2023, June 18). Recycling Strategies in a Collector-Led Remanufacturing Supply Chain. In Encyclopedia.
Yang, Tianjian, et al. "Recycling Strategies in a Collector-Led Remanufacturing Supply Chain." Encyclopedia. Web. 18 June, 2023.
Recycling Strategies in a Collector-Led Remanufacturing Supply Chain

Remanufacturing has been regarded as a key to the sustainable development of enterprises. However, collection strategies affect the remanufacturing and recycling of used products. Blockchain can ensure the authenticity of disclosed information and improve the consumer’s trust in remanufactured products.

remanufacturing blockchain collection channel recycling strategies

1. Introduction

With the development of society, environmental deterioration and resource shortages are becoming more and more serious. As an effective way to protect the environment and save resources, remanufacturing has been recognized by enterprises [1][2]. Remanufacturing is a process in which used or underperforming products are collected through recycling channels and then remanufactured. Product recycling is an essential part of remanufacturing. Different recycling modes affect optimal decision-making and pricing in a remanufacturing supply chain. In practice, a manufacturer can collect used products in three main ways. One is that the manufacturer has in-house collection channels, such as Xerox and Fuji Films [3][4]. Another is that the manufacturer assigns product collection to its retailer, such as Kodak [4]. The third one is that the manufacturer outsources the collection activity to a dedicated collector. In the literature on collection mode selection, the manufacturer is usually the leader in the supply chain, while some powerful collectors have become upstream leaders of the manufacturers in recent years, for example, IBM’s Global Asset Recovery Services, the world’s largest mobile phone recycler ReCellular, and the world’s largest metal electronics recycler SIMS Metal Management [5].

In contrast to new products, however, consumers still have doubts about remanufactured products, such as uncertainty about the product’s quality, low evaluations, or distrust [6][7][8][9], which decreases their willingness to purchase remanufactured products. In addition, the problem of uncertain demand in the remanufacturing supply chain has also attracted considerable theoretical and practical attention. In reality, upstream collectors are unable to obtain accurate market demand information because they are not familiar with the consumer market. Market information will have a certain impact on the operational efficiency of upstream companies [10]. Accurate market demand information can help upstream collectors adjust their inventories [11] and determine the transfer price of used products [5].

Blockchain adoption can help enable the information sharing of demand and increase consumer trust in remanufactured products. Blockchain technology ensures that the information recorded in a supply chain is transparent and unalterable for all stakeholders [12], which has been widely used in information traceability. In order to reduce consumers’ concerns about quality issues, some second-hand trading platforms use blockchain technology to provide quality inspection information, such as Paipai, a second-hand trading platform of [1]. When blockchain exists, the downstream manufacturer records the demand information in the blockchain, and the upstream collector obtains full demand information. Moreover, the authenticity of disclosed information can improve consumer trust in remanufactured products.

2. Recycling Strategies in a Collector-Led Remanufacturing Supply Chain under Blockchain and Uncertain Demand

2.1. Blockchain Adoption in Supply Chains

Blockchain technology has attracted considerable attention in supply chains. Considering the manufacturer’s brand advantages and patent license fees, Yang et al. [1] studied the impact of blockchain on remanufacturing modes. Gong et al. [13] investigated the optimal strategies of the OEM regarding adopting blockchain technology and selecting distribution channels. Niu et al. [14] examined the supply chain members’ preferences for blockchain adoption considering consumers’ risk-aversion and quality distrust. Zhang et al. [15] analyzed the impact of three different blockchain adoption scenarios on the direct and retail channels of a dual-channel supply chain, where the three scenarios include both manufacturers and e-retailers adopting blockchain, manufacturers adopting blockchain, and e-retailers adopting blockchain. Cui et al. [16] used game theory to provide a theoretical investigation into the value and design of a traceability-driven blockchain under serial supply chains and parallel supply chains. Zheng et al. [17] studied the optimal blockchain-based traceability strategies in agricultural product supply chains under different strategic choices among multiple agents. Wang et al. [18] explored a three-echelon supply chain participants’ motivation, condition, and roles by analyzing the game equilibrium of the no, upper-stream, lower-stream, and entire blockchain-driven accounts receivable chains. Zhang et al. [15] explored supply chain members’ attitude towards three blockchain adoption scenarios (only manufacturer, only e-retailer, and both players) considering the direct sales channel and the retail channel.

2.2. Demand Uncertainty in Supply Chains

Most studies focus on the incentives for uncertain demand exchange among supply chain members. Uncertain demand can be categorized into two types: stochastic nature and fuzzy uncertainty. Currently, most studies with uncertain needs are stochastic nature. Cai et al. [5] examined how the manufacturer shares demand information and the effects of different demand-sharing strategies on collector-led CLSCs. Huang et al. [19] developed a win-win contract based on a revenue sharing and price markdown and studied how vendors and retailers share their risks and benefits under stochastic demand during the pandemic. Ji and Liu [20] studied how the two-part tariff and ZRS contract (zero wholesale price-revenue-sharing-plus-side-payment contract) affect risks and supply chain coordination when market demand and supplier yield are both uncertain. Zhang et al. examined partial demand information sharing from three sharing methods (neither, one, or both of the manufacturers) in a supply chain consisting of a single retailer and two competitive manufacturers. Garai and Paul [21] explored supply chain coordination in a closed-loop supply chain comprising one retailer, one main supplier whose demand is stochastic uncertain, and a backup supplier. Li et al. [22] built a two-stage stochastic program and investigated a comprehensive production planning problem considering uncertain demand and risk-averse. Some other literature has studied demand uncertainty in supply chains from the perspective of fuzzy uncertainty. For example, Pei et al. [23] investigated the pricing problem of dual-channel green supply chains based on fuzzy demand. Liu et al. [24] studied the closed-loop supply chain of second-hand products with ambiguous demand and different quality levels from the perspective of centralized and different authority structures.

2.3. Remanufacturing Collection Modes

The third related literature stream is about how manufacturers choose collection modes for remanufacturing. For example, Zheng et al. [25] investigated how the manufacturer and retailer choose the recycling cooperation modes between recycling alliance and cost-sharing and discovered that the optimal recycling cooperation option depends on the remanufacturing efficiency and the relative recycling cost efficiency. Considering the heterogeneity of willingness to pay, Long et al. [26] explored the optimal recycling and remanufacturing decisions by comparing four different remanufacturing modes. Yi et al. [27] examined the optimal decisions on a dual recycling channel in which the retailer and the third-party collector simultaneously collect the used products in the construction machinery industry. Huang et al. [28] further studied the optimal strategies for a triple recycling channel in a retailer-dominated closed-loop supply chain. Considering the retailer’s bank loans or trade-credit financing, Zhang and Zhang [29] analyzed optimal equilibrium strategies of electric vehicle batteries in a closed-loop supply chain with a manufacturer or capital-constrained retailer recycling. He et al. [30] examined the competitive collection and channel convenience considering a manufacturer competing with a third-party collector. In the case of channel inconvenience, Guo et al. [31] investigated the optimal emission reduction strategy in three models with different recycling structures—manufacturer-led, retailer-led, and competitive under cap-and-trade regulation. Wan [32] investigated six game theory models which consist of different sales modes and recycling modes to explore the optimal pricing and recycling rate decisions under the discount coefficient of demand and the competing intensity of recycling. Some existing literature studies the collection strategies from different authority structures. For example, Cao and Ji [33] discussed the optimal recycling strategy by establishing three different Stackelberg leadership models in garment enterprises.


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