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HandWiki. Envy-Free Item Assignment. Encyclopedia. Available online: https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/36884 (accessed on 20 September 2026).
HandWiki. Envy-Free Item Assignment. Encyclopedia. Available at: https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/36884. Accessed September 20, 2026.
HandWiki. "Envy-Free Item Assignment" Encyclopedia, https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/36884 (accessed September 20, 2026).
HandWiki. (2022, November 28). Envy-Free Item Assignment. In Encyclopedia. https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/36884
HandWiki. "Envy-Free Item Assignment." Encyclopedia. Web. 28 November, 2022.
Envy-Free Item Assignment
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The content is sourced from: https://handwiki.org/wiki/Social:Envy-free_item_assignment

Envy-free item assignment (EF assignment) is a fair item assignment problem, in which the fairness criterion is envy-freeness - each agent should receive a bundle that he believes to be at least as good as the bundle of any other agent. Since the items are indivisible, an EF assignment may not exist. The simplest case is when there is a single item and at least two agents: if the item is assigned to one agent, the other will envy. Therefore, the division procedures provide various kinds of relaxations.

item assignment envy-freeness envy

References

  1. Sylvain Bouveret, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang (2010). "Fair Division Under Ordinal Preferences: Computing Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Goods". ECAI 2010. pp. 387–392. 
  2. Budish, Eric (2011). "The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes". Journal of Political Economy 119 (6): 1061. doi:10.1086/664613.  https://dx.doi.org/10.1086%2F664613
  3. Caragiannis, Ioannis; Kurokawa, David; Moulin, Hervé; Procaccia, Ariel D.; Shah, Nisarg; Wang, Junxing (2016). "The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare". Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation - EC '16. pp. 305. doi:10.1145/2940716.2940726. ISBN 9781450339360.  https://dx.doi.org/10.1145%2F2940716.2940726
  4. Lipton, R. J.; Markakis, E.; Mossel, E.; Saberi, A. (2004). "Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '04". pp. 125. doi:10.1145/988772.988792. ISBN 1-58113-771-0.  https://dx.doi.org/10.1145%2F988772.988792
  5. Graham, R. L. (1969). "Bounds on Multiprocessing Timing Anomalies". SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 17 (2): 416. doi:10.1137/0117039.  https://dx.doi.org/10.1137%2F0117039
  6. Nguyen, Trung Thanh; Rothe, Jörg (2014). "Minimizing envy and maximizing average Nash social welfare in the allocation of indivisible goods". Discrete Applied Mathematics 179: 54. doi:10.1016/j.dam.2014.09.010.  https://dx.doi.org/10.1016%2Fj.dam.2014.09.010
  7. Brandt, Felix; Conitzer, Vincent; Endriss, Ulle; Lang, Jérôme; Procaccia, Ariel D. (2016) (in en). Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107060432. https://books.google.com/books?id=nMHgCwAAQBAJ.  (free online version)
  8. Bouveret, S.; Lang, J. (2008). "Efficiency and Envy-freeness in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: Logical Representation and Complexity". JAIR 32: 525-564. doi:10.1613/jair.2467.  https://dx.doi.org/10.1613%2Fjair.2467
  9. De Keijzer, Bart; Bouveret, Sylvain; Klos, Tomas; Zhang, Yingqian (2009). "Algorithmic Decision Theory". 5783. pp. 98. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_9. ISBN 978-3-642-04427-4.  https://dx.doi.org/10.1007%2F978-3-642-04428-1_9
  10. John P. Dickerson; Jonathan Goldman; Jeremy Karp; Ariel D. Procaccia; Tuomas Sandholm (2014). "The Computational Rise and Fall of Fairness". In Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2014),. pp. 1405–1411. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.703.8413&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Retrieved 26 August 2016.  ACM link
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