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References

1. Davies, Paul (2000). "From Constructive Philosophy to Philosophical Quietism". Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 31 (3): 314–329. doi:10.1080/00071773.2000.11007310. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00071773.2000.11007310?journalCode=rbsp20. 
2. See also "Philosophers who subscribe to quietism deny that there can be such a thing as substantial metaphysical debate between realists and their non-realist opponents (because they either deny that there are substantial questions about existence or deny that there are substantial questions about independence)." https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/
3. "Quietism". https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0184.xml. 
4. Bakhurst, David (2005). The Oxford companion to philosophy. Ted Honderich (2nd ed.). [Oxford]: Oxford University Press. pp. 779. ISBN 978-0-19-153265-8. OCLC 62563098. https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62563098. "philosophy should not aspire to produce substantive theories (e.g. the nature of meaning, the foundations of knowledge, or of the mind's place in the world...philosophy does not itself advance human knowledge, but 'leaves everything as it is'." 
5. Blackburn, Simon (2016). The Oxford dictionary of philosophy (3rd ed.). Oxford. pp. 398. ISBN 978-0-19-179955-6. OCLC 945776618. https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/945776618. "there is no standpoint from which to achieve the philosophical goal of a theory about some concept or another." 
6. "Quietism". https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0184.xml. 
7. "Realism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2019. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/. 
8. Miller, Alexander (2019), Zalta, Edward N., ed., Realism (Winter 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/realism/, retrieved 2021-04-10 
9. Miller, Alexander (2019), Zalta, Edward N., ed., Realism (Winter 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/realism/, retrieved 2021-04-10, "Philosophers who subscribe to quietism deny that there can be such a thing as substantial metaphysical debate between realists and their non-realist opponents (because they either deny that there are substantial questions about existence or deny that there are substantial questions about independence)...Quietism about the ‘debate’ between realists and their opponents can take a number of forms...This form of quietism is often associated with the work of the later Wittgenstein, and receives perhaps its most forceful development in the work of John McDowell...This is in fact the strategy pursued in Rosen 1994" 
10. Virvidakis, Stelios; Kindi, Vasso. "Quietism" (in en). https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0184.xml. "The first conception of philosophical quietism in the history of Western thought is encountered in the approach of Pyrrhonian skeptics of the Hellenistic period, who pursued imperturbability, quietude or tranquility of mind (ataraxia) through suspension of judgment (epoché) and refused assent (synkatathesis) to any philosophical thesis." 
11. Encyclopedia of philosophy. 10. Donald M. Borchert (2nd ed.). Detroit: Thomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA. 2006. ISBN 0-02-865780-2. OCLC 61151356. https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/61151356. 
12. Inwood, Brad; Jones, Alexander (2006). Encyclopedia of philosophy. 4. Donald M. Borchert (2nd ed.). Detroit: Thomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA. pp. 300–303. ISBN 0-02-865780-2. OCLC 61151356. https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/61151356. "while Epicurus rejected logic along with many other specialized intellectual endeavors as useless. For Epicurus even physics mattered only in so far as it was essential to achieving tranquility." 
13. Konstan, David (2018), Zalta, Edward N., ed., Epicurus (Summer 2018 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/epicurus/, retrieved 2021-04-10, "The philosophy of Epicurus (341–270 B.C.E.) was a complete and interdependent system, involving a view of the goal of human life (happiness, resulting from absence of physical pain and mental disturbance)" 
14. Chan, Wing-tsit (2006). Encyclopedia of philosophy. Donald M. Borchert (2nd ed.). Detroit: Thomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA. pp. 144–145. ISBN 0-02-865780-2. OCLC 61151356. https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/61151356. "The chief task of moral and spiritual cultivation is to calm one's nature through absolute impartiality...Under the influence of Buddhism Cheng Hao also advocated quietism." 
15. Blackburn, Simon (2016). The Oxford dictionary of philosophy (3rd ed.). Oxford. pp. 398. ISBN 978-0-19-179955-6. OCLC 945776618. https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/945776618. "In philosophy the doctrine doubtfully associated with Wittgenstein...Wittgenstein sympathized with this but his own practice include a relentless striving to gain a 'perspicacious representation' of perplexing elements in our thought" 
16. Tanney, Julia (2015), Zalta, Edward N., ed., Gilbert Ryle (Spring 2015 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/ryle/, retrieved 2021-04-10 
17. Kraugerud, Hanne Andrea; Ramberg, Bjørn Torgrim (2010). "The New Loud: Richard Rorty, Quietist?". Common Knowledge 16 (1): 48–65. doi:10.1215/0961754X-2009-060. ISSN 1538-4578. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/368472. 
18. Mandik, Pete (2016). "Meta-Illusionism and Qualia Quietism". Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11–12). https://philarchive.org/archive/MANMAQ. 
19. Miller, Alexander (2019), Zalta, Edward N., ed., Realism (Winter 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/realism/, retrieved 2021-04-10, "Philosophers who subscribe to quietism deny that there can be such a thing as substantial metaphysical debate between realists and their non-realist opponents (because they either deny that there are substantial questions about existence or deny that there are substantial questions about independence)." 
20. Candlish, Stewart; Damnjanovic, Nic (1996-03-28). "The Identity Theory of Truth" (in en). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/spr2013/entries/truth-identity/. "Quietism Jennifer Hornsby (1997, 1999) and McDowell (on an alternative reading to that of Fish and Macdonald) endorse a version of the identity theory they see as truistic and which they put forward as an antidote to substantive theorizing about truth.". 
21. Miller, Alexander (2019), Zalta, Edward N., ed., Realism (Winter 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/realism/, retrieved 2021-04-13, "The question of the nature and plausibility of realism arises with respect to a large number of subject matters, including ethics, aesthetics, causation, modality, science, mathematics, semantics, and the everyday world of macroscopic material objects and their properties." 
22. Miller, Alexander (2019), Zalta, Edward N., ed., Realism (Winter 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/realism/, retrieved 2021-04-13, "Generic Realism: a, b, and c and so on exist, and the fact that they exist and have properties such as F-ness, G-ness, and H-ness is (apart from mundane empirical dependencies of the sort sometimes encountered in everyday life) independent of anyone’s beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, and so on. Non-realism can take many forms, depending on whether or not it is the existence or independence dimension of realism that is questioned or rejected." 
23. Miller, Alexander (2019), Zalta, Edward N., ed., Realism (Winter 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/realism/, retrieved 2021-04-13, "Philosophers who subscribe to quietism deny that there can be such a thing as substantial metaphysical debate between realists and their non-realist opponents (because they either deny that there are substantial questions about existence or deny that there are substantial questions about independence)." 
24. Miller, Alexander (2019), Zalta, Edward N., ed., Realism (Winter 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/realism/, retrieved 2021-04-13, "One form might claim that the idea of a significant debate is generated by unsupported or unsupportable philosophical theses about the relationship of the experiencing and minded subject to their world, and that once these theses are exorcised the ‘debate’ will gradually wither away. This form of quietism is often associated with the work of the later Wittgenstein, and receives perhaps its most forceful development in the work of John McDowell" 
25. Miller, Alexander (2019), Zalta, Edward N., ed., Realism (Winter 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/realism/, retrieved 2021-04-13, "Other forms of quietism may proceed in a more piecemeal fashion, taking constraints such as Wright’s realism-relevant Cruces and arguing on a case-by-case basis that their satisfaction or non-satisfaction is of no metaphysical consequence. This is in fact the strategy pursued in Rosen 1994." 
26. Candlish, Stewart; Damnjanovic, Nic (1996-03-28). "The Identity Theory of Truth" (in en). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/spr2013/entries/truth-identity/. "While Hornsby and McDowell characterize the resulting view as an identity conception of truth, it is important to realize that they resist inflating the above remarks into an identification of truth bearers and truthmakers. To do so, they appear to think, is to move us beyond the truisms in a way which pushes us towards a correspondence theory of truth. The alternative appears to be to abandon the distinction between truth bearers and truthmakers entirely.".