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References

1. Thomas William Rhys Davids; William Stede (1921). Pali-English Dictionary. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 232–234. ISBN 978-81-208-1144-7. https://books.google.com/books?id=0Guw2CnxiucC. 
2. Monier Monier-Williams (1872). A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Oxford University Press. p. 1141. https://books.google.com/books?id=_3NWAAAAcAAJ. 
3. Harvey 2013, p. 55.
4. According to Dalai Lama, skandha means "heap, group, collection or aggregate".[9]
5. Paul Williams; Anthony Tribe (2000). Buddhist Thought. Routledge. pp. 42, 48, 58–60, 69–70. ISBN 978-0-415207003. https://books.google.com/books?id=BVvFBQAAQBAJ. 
6. Bronkhorst 2009, p. 28–31.
7. Damien Keown; Charles S. Prebish (2013). Encyclopedia of Buddhism. Routledge. pp. 321–322, 382, 844–845. ISBN 978-1-136-98588-1. https://books.google.com/books?id=NFpcAgAAQBAJ. 
8. In Rawson (1991: p.11), the first skandha is defined as: "name and form (Sanskrit nāma-rūpa, Tibetan gzugs)...". In the Pali literature, nāma-rūpa traditionally refers to the first four aggregates, as opposed to the fifth aggregate, consciousness.
9. Steven M. Emmanuel (2015). A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 587–588. ISBN 978-1-119-14466-3. https://books.google.com/books?id=P_lmCgAAQBAJ. 
10. Harvey 2013, p. 56-57.
11. The Pali canon universally identifies that vedana involves the sensing or feeling of something as pleasant, unpleasant or neutral (see, for instance, SN 22). When contemporary authors elaborate on vedana, they define it similarly (see, for instance, Nhat Hanh, 1999, p. 178; Trungpa, 2001, p. 21; and, Trungpa, 2002, p. 126). The one exception is in Trungpa (1976), pp. 20-23, where he states that the "strategies or impluses" of "indifference, passion and aggression" are "part of the third stage [aggregate]," "guided by perception." (This section of Trungpa, 1976, is anthologized in Trungpa, 1999, pp. 55-58.)
12. Generally, vedanā is considered to not include "emotions." For example, Bodhi (2000a), p. 80, writes: "The Pali word vedanā does not signify emotion (which appears to be a complex phenomenon involving a variety of concomitant mental factors), but the bare affective quality of an experience, which may be either pleasant, painful or neutral." Perhaps somewhat similarly, Trungpa (1999), p.58, writes: "Consciousness [the fifth aggregate] consists of emotions and irregular thought patterns...."
13. Some translate this term as perception although this is typically the translation of pratyakṣa meaning the apprehension of sensibilia and not any subsequent judgement concerning them. The English word conception is more accurate, although this implies less a process and more the static end result (the mental state of holding a concept)), hence discrimination is preferred.
14. David J. Kalupahana (1992). A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities. University of Hawaii Press. pp. 71–72. ISBN 978-0-8248-1402-1. https://books.google.com/books?id=SlDArya3YvcC. 
15. Thomas William Rhys Davids; William Stede (1921). Pali-English Dictionary. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 664–665. ISBN 978-81-208-1144-7. https://books.google.com/books?id=0Guw2CnxiucC. 
16. The Theravada Abhidhamma divides saṅkhāra into fifty mental factors (Bodhi, 2000a, p. 26). Trungpa (2001), pp. 47ff, following the Sarvastivada Abhidharma studied in Mahayana Buddhism, states that there are fifty-one "general types" of samskara.
17. Peter Harvey, The Selfless Mind. Curzon Press 1995, page 143-146.
18. See, for instance, SN 22.79, "Being Devoured" (Bodhi, 2000b, p. 915).
19. In commenting on the use of "consciousness" in SN 22.3 [1], Bodhi (2000b), pp. 1046-7, n. 18, states: "The passage confirms the privileged status of consciousness among the five aggregates. While all the aggregates are conditioned phenomena marked by the three characteristics, consciousness serves as the connecting thread of personal continuity through the sequence of rebirths.... The other four aggregates serve as the 'stations for consciousness' (vinnanatthitiyo: see [SN] 22:53-54). Even consciousness, however, is not a self-identical entity but a sequence of dependently arisen occasions of cognizing; see MN I 256-60."
20. Peter Harvey, The Selfless Mind. Curzon Press 1995, page 143-146
21. Harvey writes, "This is in contrast to saññā, which knows by grouping things together, labeling them. This contrast can be seen in terms of the typical objects of these states: colours for saññā (S.III.87), but tastes (S.III.87) or feelings (M.I.292) for viññāṇa. While colours usually be immediately identified, tastes and feelings often need careful consideration to properly identify them: discernment and analysis are needed."
22. This conception of consciousness is found in the Theravada Abhidhamma (Bodhi, 2000a, p. 29).
23. While not necessarily contradicted by the Nikayas, this is a particularly Mahayana statement. For instance, Nhat Hanh (1999, pp. 180-1) states: "Consciousness here means store consciousness, which is at the base of everything we are, the ground of all of our mental formations." Similarly, Trungpa (2001, pp. 73-4) states that consciousness "is the finally developed state of being that contains all the previous elements.... [C]onsciousness constitutes an immediately available source of occupation for the momentum of the skandhas to feed on."
24. Thanissaro Bhikkhu (2010), The Five Aggregates. A Study Guide https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/study/khandha.html
25. Bronkhorst 2009, p. 28.
26. MacKenzie 2013, p. 242–247.
27. Harvey 2013, p. 56.
28. * Dukkha: The first Noble Truth states that "in brief, the five bundles of grasping-fuel (upadana-skandha) are painful [dukkha]."[3][22] The five aggregates trigger suffering, pain or unsatisfactoriness. Everything that makes a person is a factor of dukkha, and these in Buddhist thought are not a source of pleasure but of sorrow.[13] Nirvana requires transcendence from all five skandhas and the sense objects.[3]* Impermanent: they come into being and dissolve.[13][23]* Anatta: each of the skandhas lacks a self and substantiality.[24] The aggregates are appearances which don't have an essence either separately or together, all that is perceived as an aggregate or a whole has no real existence.[25][20] This is the "non-self" (anatta) doctrine, and it holds that a belief in self is a source of Dukkha (suffering, pain, unsatisfactoriness).[26][27] The explicit denial of substantiality or essence in any of the five skandha appears in the early Buddhist texts: "All form is comparable to foam; all feelings to bubbles; all sensations are mirage-like; dispositions are like the plantain trunk; consciousness is but an illusion: so did the Buddha illustrate [the nature of the aggregates]."[28]
29. Peter Harvey (2012). An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices. Cambridge University Press. pp. 59–62. ISBN 978-0-521-85942-4. https://books.google.com/books?id=u0sg9LV_rEgC. 
30. The initial part of the Buddhist practice is purification of each of the above "five aggregates" through meditation, study, ritual and living by virtues, particularly abstaining from mental intoxicants. Ultimately, the practice shifts to considering these as naive, then transcending them to reach the state of realization that there is neither person nor self within, or in any other being, states Harvey, where everyone and everything is without self or substantiality and is a "cluster of changing physical and mental processes".[11][30]
31. Peter Harvey (1995), The Selfless Mind, Curzon Press, pages 228-230.
32. The physical, the personality factors (skandhas), and any sense of Self or I are a burden which the enlightened individual has dropped, thus becoming a "man of nothing", not clinging to anything internal or external.[31] The perfect state of enlightenment is one without any personality, no "I am" conceit, no physical identification, no intellectual identification, no identification in direct or indirects terms related to any of the five skandhas, because "a tathagata has abandoned the personality factors".[31] No one can find him because he has no "I", self or identity, while his citta expands to infinity; he is beyond the reach of the unenlightened human beings, as well as the army of the Mara (demon of death in Buddhism).[31]
33. William Edelglass; Jay Garfield (2009). Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 261–264, 288–295, 297–308, 358–363, 226–227, 317–329. ISBN 978-0-19-971655-5. https://books.google.com/books?id=tEb63CGvShsC. ;Irina Kuznetsova; Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad; Jonardon Ganeri (2012). "Chapter 9, see also the Introduction Chapter". Hindu and Buddhist Ideas in Dialogue: Self and No-Self. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4094-5662-9. https://books.google.com/books?id=MP0I5KNFFl8C. 
34. Rupert Gethin (16 July 1998). The Foundations of Buddhism. Oxford University Press. pp. 140–149, 238–239. ISBN 978-0-19-289223-2. https://archive.org/details/foundationsofbud00rupe. , Quote: We have seen how Buddhist thought criticizes the concept of an unchanging self as incoherent; however, both ancient and modern critics have argued that to do away with the self in the manner of Buddhist thought in fact creates insurmountable philosophical and moral problems. (...) We have seen how Buddhist thought breaks down an individual into five classes of physical and mental events known as skandhas or aggregates".
35. Ruhe 2005, p. 92–93.
36. Loy 2009, p. 63–64.
37. Pine 2004, p. 9.
38. David J. Kalupahana (1975). Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. University Press of Hawaii. pp. 85–86. ISBN 978-0-8248-0298-1. https://books.google.com/books?id=GOYGAAAAYAAJ. 
39. Adrian Snodgrass (1984) asserts that the term literally means "heap", and the concept refers to the teaching accepted by all Buddhist schools that "the personality is an aggregate of five constituent parts," referring back to older publications from the 1930s to the 1950s.[38]
40. Gethin 1986.
41. Gethin: "To explain the khandhas as the Buddhist analysis of man, as has been the tendency of contemporary scholars, may not be incorrect as far as it goes, yet it is to fix upon one facet of the treatment of the khandhas at the expense of others. Thus A. B. Keith could write, “By a division which ... has certainly no merit, logical or psychological, the individual is divided into five aggregates or groups.” However, the five khandhas, as treated in the nikāyas and early abhidhamma, do not exactly take on the character of a formal theory of the nature of man. The concern is not so much the presentation of an analysis of man as object, but rather the understanding of the nature of conditioned existence from the point of view of the experiencing subject. Thus at the most general level rūpa, vedanā, sañña, and are presented as five aspects of an individual being's experience of the world; each khandha is seen as representing a complex class of phenomena that is continuously arising and falling away in response to processes of consciousness based on the six spheres of sense. They thus become the five upādānakkhandhas, encompassing both grasping and all that is grasped."[39]
42. Boisvert 2005, p. 147.
43. Bosivert 2005, p. 150.
44. Boisvert 2005, p. 147-148.
45. Boisvert 2005, p. 148.
46. Bronkhorst 2009, p. 26-32.
47. Bronkhorst 2009, p. 27.
48. Bronkhorst: "The aim of the teaching of the Buddha is evidently not to discover the real self. On the contrary, the preoccupation with the true nature of the self has to be given up. Only then one is ready to follow the path shown by the Buddha. Seen from this practical point of view, the question as to the existence of the self is of minor importance. The main thing is that knowledge of the self plays no useful role on the Buddha’s path to liberation. In view of the fact that certain non-Buddhist currents asserted a permanent self not subject to change because only knowledge of such a self could be useful to the attainment of liberation, it is probably justified to assume that the Buddha did not accept the existence of such a self."[45]
49. Bronkhorst 2009, p. 28-29.
50. Bronkhorst: "Acquiring the insight that the various components of the person are not the self causes a wise and noble listener to turn away from material form, and so on; as a result he becomes free from desire and attains liberation."[45]
51. Albahari, Miri (March 2002). "Against No-Ātman Theories of Anattā". Asian Philosophy 12 (1): 5–20. doi:10.1080/09552360220142225. ISSN 0955-2367.  https://dx.doi.org/10.1080%2F09552360220142225
52. Bodhi 2000b, p. 1122.
53. Bodhi 2000b, pp. 1125-127.
54. According to Bikkhu Bodhi, the Maha-punnama Sutta, also called The Great Full-moon Night Discourse, describes the impermanence of the aggregates to assert that there is no self, and the right discernment is, "this is not mine, this is not my self, this is not what I am". From Maha-punnama Sutta [Buddha:] "It's possible that a senseless person — immersed in ignorance, overcome with craving — might think that he could outsmart the Teacher's message in this way: 'So — form is not-self, feeling is not-self, perception is not-self, fabrications are not-self, consciousness is not-self. Then what self will be touched by the actions done by what is not-self?' Now, monks, haven't I trained you in counter-questioning with regard to this & that topic here & there? What do you think — Is form constant or inconstant?" "Inconstant, lord." "And is that which is inconstant easeful or stressful?" "Stressful, lord." "And is it fitting to regard what is inconstant, stressful, subject to change as: 'This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am'?" [Monks:] "No, lord." "... Is feeling constant or inconstant?" "Inconstant, lord."... "... Is perception constant or inconstant?" "Inconstant, lord."... "... Are fabrications constant or inconstant?" "Inconstant, lord."... "What do you think, monks — Is consciousness constant or inconstant?" "Inconstant, lord." "And is that which is inconstant easeful or stressful?" "Stressful, lord." "And is it fitting to regard what is inconstant, stressful, subject to change as: 'This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am'?" "No, lord." "Thus, monks, any form whatsoever that is past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: every form is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment as: 'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am.' – Majjhima Nikaya iii 15, Translated by Thanissaro Bhikkhu[50]
55. Bodhi 2000b, p. 1123.
56. Bodhi, 2000b, pp. 1122-23
57. Bodhi (2000b), pp. 1125-26
58. The Pāli word dhātu is used in multiple contexts in the Pāli canon: For instance, Bodhi (2000b), pp. 527-8, identifies four different ways that dhātu is used including in terms of the "eighteen elements" and in terms of "the four primary elements" (catudhātu).
59. The first five sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) are derivates of form. The sixth sense organ (mind) is part of consciousness. The first five sense objects (visible forms, sound, smell, taste, touch) are also derivatives of form. The sixth sense object (mental object) includes form, feeling, perception and mental formations. The six sense consciousnesses are the basis for consciousness.[54]
60. Bodhi (2000a), p. 6.
61. Shulman 2007.
62. Jurewicz 2000.
63. Frauwallner 1973, p. 167-168.
64. Schumann 1997.
65. Bucknell 1999.
66. Gombrich 2009.
67. Jones 2009.
68. Wayman 1984, p. 173 with note 16.
69. Wayman 1990, p. 256.
70. Wayman 1971.
71. Boisvert 1995.
72. Gombrich 2009, p. 138.
73. Boisvert 1995, p. 127.
74. Boisvert 1995, p. 127-128.
75. >Put another way, it is through the five skandhas that clinging occurs. See, for instance, the Samadhi Sutta (SN 22:5) (Thanissaro, 2006b). http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.005.than.html
76. The apparent distinctions between the nidana model and the khandha model are reduced when, instead of using the twelve-nidana model of the Samyutta Nikaya, chapter 12 (e.g., Thanissaro, 1997d), one compares the nine-nidana model of the Maha-nidana Sutta (DN 15) (Thanissaro, 1997a) where consciousness conditions name-and-form and name-and-form conditions consciousness. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.002.than.html
77. Bodhi (2000b, pp. 839-840) writes: "Whereas the teaching on dependent origination is intended to disclose the dynamic pattern running through everyday experience that propels the round of rebirth and death forward from life to life, the teaching on the five aggregates concentrates on experience in its lived immediacy in the continuum from birth to death." Perhaps in a similar vein, Bodhi (2000b, pp. 762-3, n. 132) notes elsewhere that, according to the Samyutta Nikaya's subcommentary: "There are two kinds of origin, momentary origin (khanika-samudaya) and origin through conditions (paccaya-samudaya). A bhikkhu who sees one sees the other."
78. Williams 2000, p. 46.
79. Kuan 2008, p. i, 9, 81.
80. (Pāli: kāya-sati, kāyagatā-sati; Skt. kāya-smṛti)
81. Salient sections of the Pāli canon on kāya-sati (kāya-gatā-sati): http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/g_m/kaaya_gata_sati.htm
82. (Pāli vedanā-sati; Skt. vedanā-smṛti)
83. (Pāli citta-sati; Skt. citta-smṛti)
84. (Pāli dhammā-sati; Skt. dharma-smṛti)
85. Polak 2011, p. 153-156, 196-197.
86. According to Nattier (1992), the Heart Sutra was originally composed in Chinese and later back-translated into Sanskrit. Thereafter, it became popular in India and later Tibet. Elements in this translation are not present in Chinese versions of this sutra.
87. Red Pine (2004), p.2.
88. See also Nhat Hanh (1988), p. 1, and Suzuki (1960), p. 26. Nhat Hanh (1988) adds to this first verse the sentence: "After this penetration, he overcame all pain." Suzuki (1960), p. 29, notes that this additional sentence is unique to Hsuan-chuang's translation and is omitted in other versions of the Heart Sutra.
89. In the Theravada canon, the English word "self-existence" is a translation of the Sanskrit word svabhava. "Svabhava" has also been translated as "self-nature" (Suzuki, 1960, p. 26), "separate self" (Nhat Hanh, 1988, p. 16) and "self-existence" (Red Pine, 2004, p. 67). Note that Chinese versions of the Heart Sutra do not contain the notion of svabhava. When "emptiness of self" is mentioned, the English word "self" is a translation of the Pali word "atta" (Sanskrit, "atman").
90. Regarding the term sabhāva (Pali; Skt: svabhāva) in the Pali Canon, Gal (2003), p. 7, writes: "To judge from the suttas, the term sabhāva was never employed by the Buddha and it is rare in the Pali Canon in general. Only in the post-canonical period does it become a standard concept, when it is extensively used in the commentarial descriptions of the dhammas [conditioned mental and physical processes] and in the sub-commentarial exegesis.The term sabhāva, though, does occur on various occasions in five canonical or para-canonical texts: the Paṭisambhidāmagga, the Peṭakopadesa, the Nettippakaraṇa, the Milindapañha and the Buddhavaṃsa."Gal (p. 10) speculates that the use of the term sabhāva in the Paṭisambhidāmagga might be the earliest occurrence in Pali literature and quotes (p. 7, esply. n. 28) from this text (Paṭis. II 178) the application of the phrase sabhāvena suññaṃ (Pali for "empty of sabhāva") to each of the aggregates — at least superficially similar to an application of svabhāva in the Prajnaparamita Hridaya Sutra ("Heart Sutra") cited in this article.
91. Nhat Hanh (1988), p.1. Again, also see Red Pine (2004), p. 2, and Suzuki (1960), p. 26.
92. Kalupahana 1975, page 78
93. Jinpa 2002 , page 112.
94. Lai 2003.
95. Swanson 1993, p. 373.
96. Suzuki (1960), p. 29, n. 4.
97. Trungpa, 2001, pp. 10–12; and, Trungpa, 2002, pp. 124, 133–134
98. This type of analysis of the aggregates (where ignorance conditions the five aggregates) might be akin to that described by the Twelve Nidanas.
99. Trungpa Rinpoche 1976, pp. 20–22
100. Trungpa Rinpoche 1976, p. 23