CSR performance is extensively related to an organization’s value building in that more CSR expenditures can increase an organization’s financial and non-financial performance and ensure transparency [5,12,19,44]. In general, organizations with poor corporate governance, ineffective regulations, and high political engagement tend to engage in corruption [19,22]. CSR is an important tool for an organization to restore its image and reputation. Organizations consider CSR disclosure an influential mechanism to demonstrate non-involvement with unethical and anti-social practices [5,12]. Socially responsible companies are involved in more CSR activities, and CSR performance is closely associated with corruption disclosure. Organizations supporting CSR-related issues want to disclose information on these issues to their diverse stakeholders to secure social acceptance and reputation. The prior literature argues that CSR performance is positively associated with corporate anti-corruption initiatives [19]. The nature of CSR expenditure depends on the management strategy and policy influenced by the quality of governance and the control of corruption [22]. Less effective control of corruption motivates organizations to use CSR expenditure for political connections and personal investments [19].

Cho et al. [45] reported that environmental expenditure is positively related to disclosure. Bae et al. [38] explored the green financing motivations of Bangladeshi firms and documented that political boards are dominant in green and sustainable decisions. Masud et al. [1] documented that political presence on the board, directly and indirectly, influences corporate corruption reporting in Bangladeshi firms. They also evidenced that corporate political connections negatively moderated the direction of laws in relation to corruption reporting. Uddin et al. [19] identified that Bangladeshi banking companies use CSR expenditure for the ruling political party’s agenda implementation and the personal benefit of powerful managers. Moreover, the recent study by Jahid et al. [44] found that ownership of the firm significantly enhanced the CSR expenditure of Bangladeshi firms. The argument posits that more CSR expenditure has a supportive relationship with corruption disclosure. Hoi and Lin [46] noted two CSR motivations that prevent organizations from being corrupt, namely, extrinsic regulations (penalty) and intrinsic motivations (integrity). Generally, a highly corrupt environment motivates organizations to engage in political connections. Thus, management in this environment is inclined to more anti-corruption disclosure to signal their efforts to prevent involvement in corruption. Therefore, PCSR and corruption disclosure imply companies’ long-term strategic commitment against corruption. Prior research on political connections and CSR evidenced positive and significant relationships [28]. This study explained that higher political connections force organizations to adopt higher levels of awareness and implement CSR policies. Lopatta et al. [5] documented that more CSR performance decreases the level of corruption risk of a firm. Baldini et al. [12] find a significant negative association between corruption and CSR disclosure. Furthermore, Chen [22] states that the control of corruption and effectiveness of corporate governance significantly depends on the effectiveness of law and argues that ineffective law spread low control of corruption. Due to the nature of the financial sector of Bangladesh—that is, large PCSR expenditure, less control of corruption, and ineffective corporate regulation—the management of firms with high CSR expenditure and political connections are motivated to disclose anti-corruption information to seek legitimacy with society and stakeholders and to demonstrate organizational commitment against anti-corruption.

It is assumed that corporate corruption is frequently related to cash shortages or liquidity mismanagement. Holding more cash is beneficial to management because of political donations, bribery, and other informal connections to gain a positive NPV (net present value) from an investment in a highly corrupt and ineffective corporate governance environment [22,47,48]. The lack of effective corporate governance inclines management to hold more cash for short-term investment because of the absence of monitoring. However, such types of cash investments often fail to return the maximum value of investment because of unorganized and uneconomical investments [47]. Moreover, in highly corrupt and poorly regulated countries, huge explicit and implicit political costs reduce a firm’s value because of management’s personal, benefit-driven strategy [22,47,48,49].

Prior studies documented the negative relationship between more cash holdings and corruption. Pinkowitz et al. [49] argue that more cash holdings in firms with poor investor protection reduce the firm’s value. Garmaise and Liu [50] state that holding more cash reduces a firm’s value because of more involvement in corruption. Moreover, high control of corruption and effective corporate governance increase a firm’s value because of efficient liquidity management and less agency cost. Huang and Zhang [51] demonstrate that more disclosure practices prevent management from holding on to excessive cash. Chen [22] conducted a study on 47 countries for cash holdings and control of corruption and documented that corporate cash holdings have a negative relationship with the level of corruption and effectiveness of corporate regulation and securities law. On the other hand, regulation positively affects disclosure performance as it is guided by a country’s political and legal systems. Baldini et al. [12] argue that the level of corruption is significantly influenced by national and international regulations, and the result is consistent with Masud et al. [11] and Barkemeyer et al. [33]. Moreover, Lopatta et al. [5] pointed out that strong reporting regulations decrease additional disclosure requirements. Thus, following international reporting guidelines means disclosing more corruption activities is the company’s internationalization process. Therefore, we argue that the Bangladeshi financial sector companies’ corporate corruption disclosure is significantly related to more cash holdings and the internationalization of a firm’s reporting regulations.

The media plays an important role in exploring social issues, and media exposure has an important role in the disclosure literature. The prior literature has extensively investigated the relationship between media visibility and the CSR disclosure of firms and documented mixed results. Strong freedom of the press reveals highly unethical inside information about organizations and the government and discovers irregularities. Press freedom has an inverse relationship with corruption because restricted media coverage implies more corruption. However, there are very limited studies on media visibility and corruption disclosure in the financial sector. Deegan et al. [52] conducted a longitudinal study on CSR and the media coverage of Australian firms from 1983 to 1997 and reported that CSR disclosure has a positive relationship with media visibility, and the result is consistent with Branco and Rodrigues [53]. Islam and Deegan [54] investigated the media’s effect on CSR disclosures and documented a significant, positive relationship for two US- and Sweden-based multinational corporations. Park and Lee [55] conducted a survey of 472 respondents from South Korea on the influence of traditional and social media on perceived corruption. They found significant positive effects from traditional media rather than social media on corruption perception in the public sector. Masud et al. [1] found a positive relationship between media and corporate corruption disclosure of Bangladeshi-listed firms. Islam and Islam [56] posit that global gas companies’ environmental incidents are negatively covered in national and international media. Moreover, Islam et al. [34] documented that Chinese mobile companies’ increased bribery disclosures were positively related to international media coverage, consistent with Islam et al. [31]. A recent study by Blanc et al. [23] argued that media exposure is positively associated with corporate corruption disclosure. Masud et al. [1] documented that media visibility plays a positive role in Bangladeshi financial firms’ decision to disclose corruption information. The most recent study by Bae et al. [38] empirically found that Bangladeshi media positively influenced green financial promotions. Furthermore, Comyns [37] found negative relationships between media visibility and GHG disclosure of MNCs. Considering the general public sentiment against corruption, the media sets particular agendas for initiating anti-corruption movements.

Organizations engage in corruption for financial and non-financial advantages (tender, licensing, or investment) from the state that requires bribery or other means of informal communication [31,34]. Luo [57] identified that foreign investment is negatively associated with corruption. Corruption weakens investor protection because low control of corruption reduces transparency and accountability, which ultimately decreases the value of a firm [22]. Thus, financial constraints decrease all types of organizational investments because of limited credit availability, inability to raise money from the stock market, excessive dependence on loans, illiquidity of assets, and liquidity crises [5,58,59,60]. Financial constraints and anti-corruption disclosure should have a positive relationship because financially constrained firms significantly rely on external financing and face liquidity crises that allure unethical and informal transactions [5,60]. Garmaise and Liu [50] and Donadelli et al. [61] document that corruption is closely related to an organization’s investments and returns, while low control of corruption directly reduces the firm’s value by distorting investment decisions. Moreover, Bodnaruk et al. [60] argued that more financially constrained firm managers prefer to disclose more constraints in their annual reports. Lopatta et al. [5] document that financial constraints are positively linked to corruption risk disclosure. Additionally, Blanc et al. [23] and Islam et al. [34] argue that bribery and corruption disclosure is closely associated with different financial factors of organizations, including investment and growth. Furthermore, Chen [22] investigated a cross-country analysis of corruption and documented that different types of financial variables, such as dividends, leverage, and market value, have mixed relations with low control of corruption and vice-versa. The most recent study by Wellalage et al. [2] indicates that corruption increases the possibility of SME credit constraints in South Asian countries. Additionally, Bae et al. [38] found that Bangladeshi financially constrained firms are negatively promoted in climate and social innovations because of financial limitations and credibility.