In the Haile Selassie Imperial period (1930–1974), villagers had the privilege of using natural and life resources in communal lands in exchange for collectively conserving them. The Imperial regime institutionalized a feudalistic landlord-tenant relationship in rural Ethiopia [59]. In this land administration system, landlords paid taxes to the government, and most villagers cultivated croplands as tenants. Up to the end of the Imperial regime in 1974, a traditional land tenure and property right system called Irist (Amhara), based on a blood-related group of people, was the dominant system from north to central Ethiopia⁸ [61].

The socialist regime (1974–1991) that overthrew the Imperial government in 1974 prohibited private land ownership, confiscating land from landlords and distributing it to tenants. The socialist regime established an administration body, i.e., a peasant association (PA), in every village (kebele). Every villager over 18 registered as a PA member, and the PA gave them farmland. A land-reform proclamation issued simultaneously gave authority to PAs for communal natural and life resource management in the village. The land tenure and property rights system (Irist) in the Imperial regime was abolished. Hamlet dwellers were deprived of the privilege of communal land use. However, because the socialist government did not have any explicit policy on communal land use, and PAs could not substantially resolve land holding and tenure disputes, communal lands were gradually encroached upon, partly turning into individual croplands [62]. Villagers having critical feelings about vegetation reduction due to increases in human and livestock populations took the initiative and began natural and life resource management in various regions [63]. Its key feature was that hamlet dwellers in different areas continuously assumed communal land management. Grazing land management in Tigray, called hizati (Tigrinya), was undertaken by qushet (hamlet) [64]. In Amhara in 1999/2000, 53% of the villages had at least one communal grazing area managed by the village (kebele; 30%) and hamlet (gott; 70%) [47]. Villagers were motivated to participate in natural resource management programs of the socialist regime by a combination of campaign-based mass mobilization and FFW [18,32]. PAs selected who would join in the work [31]. FFW was supplied to the participants. However, many farmers did not necessarily willingly or voluntarily participate in the programs⁹ [65].

After the natural resource package programs with mass mobilization and FFW in the 1980s failed, the EPRDF regime (1991–2019), which defeated the socialist regime, introduced two policies following the recommendations of donor agencies. One was land registration, which was a neoliberal policy, and the other was a participatory natural resource management approach. The EPRDF began land registration and certification programs in 1998 [66]. The land registration program improved land use rights and tenure security for individual holdings [67]. A 1997 Ethiopian federal proclamation (law) devolved responsibility for land policy to the regions. Land use policies for personal land use, e.g., land registration, were more or less similar among the regional governments; however, considerable diversity in key policies was observed for communal land management among the regions¹⁰ [66]. Even in the EPRDF period, the Amhara and Oromia regional governments entrusted communal land management to PAs and did not implement any explicit communal land use policy. The Amhara agricultural office decided to exclose 61,178 ha of degraded hillsides between 1995 and 1998, and entrusted the exclosure hillside management to PAs; however, this trial failed, and encroaching started again [68].

A campaign-based watershed management program, which began nationwide in 2012, did not supply FFW to the participants. The program introduced three new approaches that were not seen in the 1980s’ package programs: (i) planning and implementation in the unit of the micro-watershed (200–500 ha); (ii) a micro-watershed association was organized at the PA level; and (iii) training was given to the participant farmers before the program implementation [32]. Practically, the micro-watershed association, which was composed of landless and deprived households, was organized¹¹. The conservation techniques used in the program were almost the same as those used in the 1980’s package program. Assefa [32] investigated three villages in the Boset district. The effectiveness of the hillside conservation was unclear¹² [32]. Conflicts were frequently observed between the micro-watershed associations and farmers who lived near the micro-watersheds and between the micro-watershed association and a youth association [32]. Assefa [32] concluded that farmers are less motivated to participate in the program or adopt conservation technologies that will not generate short-term benefits. They are motivated to contribute labor and working tools with pressure from local government actors.

The principal features of participatory natural resource management in the Tigray region are, first, the hamlet (qushet) manages communal grazing lands and forests. In Tigray, 90% of the villages (tabia; the same as kebele in other regions) had an average of four communal grazing lands managed by hamlets [70]. In Tigray, 88% of the villages had at least one exclosed communal forest, of which the village managed 30% and the hamlet managed 58% [25]. In other Ethiopian regions, communal forests and grazing lands were encroached upon, turning into croplands most in the EPRDF period (1991–2019). In contrast, natural resource management programs in Tigray made tremendous progress in the EPRDF period. Exclosure hillsides in Tigray expanded from 143,000 ha in 1996 to 895,220 ha in 2011 [71]. During these periods, based on the hizati system, which was continuously maintained since the Imperial period, hamlets managed communal grazing land¹³ [63]. In the 884 ha catchment studied by Ogawa et al. [77], the increase in exclosure communal forests, continuous communal grazing lands management, and livestock population increase resulted in (i) the disappearance of free-grazing areas (free grazing was allowed all year round), (ii) an increase in the rainy-season exclosure grazing land (free grazing was allowed only in the dry season), and (iii) an increase in exclosure communal forests (reforested areas where grazing and cutting trees were prohibited, but firewood collection from dead branches and cut-and-carry grass collection were allowed)¹⁴. The land use changes of (ii) above were based on mutual discussions between hamlets and those of (iii) were led by the regional government. A comparison between the Imperial period, the socialist period, and the survey year (2017) elucidated that, although the livestock population was highest in 2017, the vegetation in the survey catchment was the highest in 2017 [77].

The second prominent feature of the Tigray participatory approach is the integration of an indigenous hamlet-based labor quota system (the baito system; Tigrinya) into natural resource management programs. Haregeweyn et al. [79] investigated a campaign-based watershed management program that was implemented in a catchment (2343 ha). In Tigray, this program was launched in 2004 as a forerunner of the national-level program. A team comprising hamlet representatives, extension workers (development agents in Ethiopia), and agricultural officers makes management and collective work plans. An actual earthwork was implemented using the baito labor quota system. A continuous program implementation from 2004 to 2009 reduced runoff and soil loss from the catchment in 2009 to 27% and 89% of the 2004 level, respectively. Gullies in the catchment were almost rehabilitated.

Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the ruling party of the regional government, originally advocated a people’s participatory approach. In 1991, TPLF took up the indigenous baito system for natural resource management programs and small-scale infrastructure development programs, including for roads, schools, and clinics [64]. Although FFW is sometimes paid for work participants, all adult men and women contribute 20–27 working days per year without payment under the baito [33]. In the two hamlets surveyed by Girmay [33] in 2003, 53% of the collective work was for cropland SWC, 18% was for hillside SWC, and 29% was for road maintenance, gully treatment, and communal pond maintenance. The baito has a bylaw that punishes villagers who do not participate in the collective work without any legitimate reasons. This bylaw, called sirit (Tigrinya), is codified in every hamlet.

The third feature of the Tigray participatory approach is a unique local administration system that connects the district (woreda), village (tabia), and hamlet (qushet), called the baito administration system. The cadres of the village and hamlet levels are elected, and the village representatives become a member of the district baito administration. Disputes between hamlets and conflict in a catchment between upper and lower streams are resolved at an upper-level baito administration. The primary factors of the successful campaign-based watershed management program in Tigray were a democratic local administration system that planned a micro-watershed management program and the baito labor quota system that implemented the work [79].

Kumasi and Asenso-Okyere [80] surveyed villagers’ perceptions of the baito system from twenty hamlets in three districts ¹⁵. The hamlet dwellers were connected directly or indirectly to each other through the network of information on collective work. Those who were at the center of the information exchange were (i) the Ethiopian Orthodox priest, (ii) the development group leader, and (iii) the baite leader at the hamlet level [80]. The construction of social capital through the institutionalization of the indigenous hamlet-based labor quota system and incorporation of the hamlet into the local administration system is part of successful CPR management in Tigray [82] ¹⁶.