Three years after the end of the war, Western governments seemed ready to make major concessions to the Europeanists in response to the various demands expressed at the end of the Hague Congress (7–10 May 1948) 1 [1,2,3,4,5]. Of these, the proposal for a European Assembly seemed the boldest because it touched at the heart of the political sovereignty of each state. The main goal was to create a genuine European democracy (albeit limited to the West) in a context that fostered enthusiasm for the project: states that still seemed weak shortly after the war would be obliged to find solutions through greater co-operation while the growing threat to the East suggested a need for urgent action. In this sense, the Council of Europe was the first European organisation to have a parliamentary body and the objective of closer union between members was enshrined in its Statute. However, it must be noted that the Council of Europe system is a two-tier one, with the intergovernmental element—the Committee of Ministers—taking precedence as an executive body over the parliamentary element—the Consultative Assembly (a name that in this respect is quite revealing). However, on the issue of the future powers of the Assembly, as on many other points, the pro-Europeans were not in total agreement: some (the “unionists”) favoured a simple organ of co-operation, while others (the “federalists”) wanted the Assembly to be a constituent body. The latter, who had been united since December 1946 within the European Union of Federalists (EUF), which claimed to have no fewer than 150,000 activists, were very insistent. For them, the necessary “driving force” for the establishment of European democracy seemed to be ruled out by the monopoly exercised by statesmen within the framework of a Europe of nations. For this reason, the federalists rejected institutions they believed reproduced the classic model of national parliamentarianism in order to replace it with a model that was more acceptable to other stakeholders, the only model capable of “interposing the newest and most advanced ideas” (Fernand Dehousse) 2 [6]. In many respects, the Council of Europe may indeed appear disappointing. Established by the Treaty of London, this international institution with a legal personality recognised in public international law aims to ensure the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law in Europe by means of legal standards in the fields of human rights protection. However, British reluctance had resulted in the body becoming an intergovernmental body rather than the supranational body federalists had hoped for. In the end, the executive Committee of Ministers dampened the ardour of the Parliamentary Assembly, which had been reduced to being a talking shop that lacked any leverage over the realities of the European debate. It was therefore a case of focusing their energy on giving the Assembly the highest possible visibility by organising large-scale demonstrations around it.

Convinced of the destiny of an integrated Europe, the federalists imagined a supranational democratic political structure in which legislative power would have a central role. In contrast to the functional approach envisaged by the Schuman Plan, the idea was to defend a “political” Europe by giving substance to the still vague notion of “European parliamentarism”. In this article, we will look at how this struggle was conducted in the early days of the Council of Europe; a struggle between the hopes raised by its creation and the radicalisation that the Cold War soon brought to the process of European construction.

The context of the late 1940s must be taken into account in order to understand the state of mind of the federalists, halfway between euphoria and doubts. On the positive side, we can underline the existence of unwavering support from the Americans, who had just confirmed their commitment to the construction of Europe, in fact Western Europe, by signing the Atlantic Pact (4 April 1949), responding to the call from the Europeans with the Brussels Pact of 17 March 1948. The Council of Europe was one of the consequences of this process of rapprochement, in which European integration became a decisive argument: it constituted the political part of a triptych that began with the economy with the Marshall Plan and continued at the diplomatic level with the Brussels Pact. Of course, the Council of Europe was not a political forum for parliamentarians, but rather a classic international organisation because of the British will, with the Labour government putting the brakes on the integration process. This attitude, which was confirmed by the publication the following year of a manifesto opposing this process 3, was an element of context which obviously upset the federalists.

Caught between enthusiasm and reticence, the federalists nevertheless launched a pressure campaign using the Council of Europe as a sounding board. Thus, after the adoption of the Statute of this institution on 5 May 1949, the Central Committee of the EUF approved a “motion on the Consultative Assembly” 4 in which it openly called for the drafting of a Federal Pact to create a genuine seat of European power. Faced with the modest intergovernmental status of the Council of Europe, the EUF proposed that its Assembly should be transformed from a “consultative” body to a “constituent” one, which was tantamount to condemning any kind of conciliatory attitude. This radical demand contrasted with the much more modest one that the International Executive Committee of the European Movement had presented to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 9 May, in which only a few minor requests were made 5. This moderation was realistic, with most members of the Committee believing that Britain would oppose any radical demands 6, just as the previous month it had rejected Jean Monnet’s proposals to merge the British and French economies 7 [7]. On the other hand, within the EUF, the constituent path was becoming increasingly important: it was now a case of exerting unrestrained pressure in as many forums as possible in order to get rid of the initial reluctance and enable their ideals to triumph. The most important of these remained the Council of Europe, which the federalists saw as an institution that could be improved.

The differences between the EUF and its more moderate partners in the European Movement (EM) became apparent at the latter’s first congress, which was held in Brussels on 25 February 1949, showing that not everyone in the Europeanist camp was satisfied. The unionists were pleased because the EM was largely inspired by the memorandum sent on 18 August 1948 by the Coordinating Committee of European Movements. This memorandum was drawn up by Paul Ramadier, who took charge of the institutional commission set up at the Hague Congress. It was a step back from the political resolution of The Hague—particularly with regard to Article 3, which called for the transfer of certain sovereign rights of States to the Assembly of the Council of Europe—as there was no longer any question of giving the latter “any legislative or executive power” which confined it to a consultative role. However, there was some progress in certain areas, such as cultural exchanges, the Charter of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice 8. The federalists were still confident that “a decisive step” had been taken, from which “the European federalist idea would be transferred to the governmental level” 9. However, the initial hope that a Constituent Assembly would be set up on a European scale soon gave way to disappointment, inasmuch as the planned European assembly no longer had constituent powers and could be compared to a mere study group. The main sticking point was of course the European Assembly. The new president of the Central Committee, Henri Frenay, stated that they had “no ambition to set up a European Commonwealth based on fragile contracts” 10 [8,9] and underlined the differences between the federalists he represented, and “those who are Europeans for fear of danger”, i.e., those who would be satisfied with a defensive Europe and basic co-operation. The era of half-measures seemed to be over, which foreshadowed a difficult relationship with other Europeanist movements. Similarly, differences of opinion were emerging over the composition of the Council of Europe: the federalists thought it should include non-parliamentarians as well as members of parliament 11, which was only partially reflected in the recommendations adopted by the Brussels meeting 12.

However, the federalists were divided on the constitutional issue from the outset. The Italian Altiero Spinelli, who spearheaded the EUF, pushed for it to become the priority, in the spirit of the Ventotene Manifesto, which he had written in 1941, and which gave him greater prestige among his peers 13 [10]. He was given the opportunity to do so when he was asked to write a report on the strategy the movement should follow for 1949. This report, entitled “Theses for the elaboration of a policy for the EUF” 14, was presented to the Executive Committee on 25 March 1949. This document emphasised the need for a new political line “conscious of the goal to be achieved, capable of assessing the current situation in Europe, and based on intelligent tactics and adequate organisation” 15. The key term in the report is the “Federal Pact”, the aim of which was to lead all the states towards the creation of a European executive, clearly disassociating itself from the struggle led by the other European movements. In it, the Council of Europe is described as a “shadow without a body” 16. Thus, we see that some federalists did not hesitate to publicly criticise an institution that seems, even before it was born, to have been very fragile.

However, this was not the definitive strategy, since on 17 June 1949 the Central Committee of the EUF, under the leadership of the Dutchman Henri Brugmans, drafted a more conciliatory public declaration 17 that regarded the Statute of the Council of Europe of 5 May as “the first political realisation of the European idea” in accordance with the demands of the Congress of The Hague, and recognised the work and importance of the European Movement. The election of Paul-Henri Spaak to the presidency of the Assembly was also welcomed as an encouraging sign. However, Brugmans’ tone was subsequently more brusque as the declaration went on to list the Council of Europe’s weaknesses—which included the rule of unanimity, the restriction of subjects to be debated by the Assembly, budgetary limitations and the weakness of its recommendations—and called for the establishment of a “Federal Pact” deemed necessary to give the Assembly sufficient powers. Thus, both wings of the EUF could be seen to be satisfied: Spinelli’s pet idea of the Federal Pact was retained while the text that proposed it resembled a compromise of which Henri Brugmans was the main architect.

The first session of the Consultative Assembly, which lasted for a month, opened in Strasbourg on 10 August 1949. Most of the participants remembered it as a happy day 18 [11,12,13], when everything seemed possible. Those who participated in this first session wanted to give the Council of Europe a political role, with a General Affairs Committee being set up in response to the opening agenda, which stipulated the “consideration of any necessary changes in the political structure of Europe”. The basic role of any parliament in a democratic system is to be able to set its own agenda and not fall under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers; however, this was an audacious position that was only supported by a fraction of Assembly members. The Europeanists’ expectations were very high, and they even exerted “physical” pressure on members of the assembly, inaugurating a veritable strategy of “institutional harassment” 19 [14]. As Henri Brugmans recalled, “the galleries on the first floor [of the building where the discussions were held] served as grandstands for ‘observers’, which included us. But we were not just observing. Whenever we thought it would be useful, we would ask an usher to pass a message to one of our friends on the assembly” 20 [15]. Indeed, the members of the EUF were forging multiple contacts with assembly members from different political backgrounds, including Germaine Peyroles of the Mouvement Républicain Populaire; the radical senator Pierre de Felice; Carlo Schmid of the Christian Democrats; the Italian socialist, Enzo Giacchero; and the conservative Henry Hopkinson and Harry Hynd of the Labour party 21, all of whom were members of one of the federalist groups belonging to the EUF. This “corridor politics” was so embarrassing to some assembly members that, during one session, Labour MP Hugh Dalton shouted: “People outside this House are trying to influence us. This is incompatible with the dignity of elected representatives!” 22 [16] Was this a result of pressure from the federalist observers? The fact remains that the first resolutions to be adopted seemed to go their way. Of the many discussions held during this first session of the Council of Europe, the amendment proposed on 5 September by British Labour MP Ronald Mackay and French Socialist representative André Philip on institutional structures is particularly noteworthy. This amendment states that “the aim of the Council of Europe is the creation of a European political authority with limited functions but real powers” 23 [17]. It was approved by a unanimous vote (88 votes) and seemed to presage a federal structure for the future. This vote was accompanied by a recommendation on human rights (September 1949) that met the wishes of the many supporters of European integration, a recommendation which would form the basis of the “European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, which would be signed by the governments on 4 November 1950.

The federalists’ intentions are best understood by analysing their “request for the elaboration of a Federal Pact” 24 (formulated on 31 October 1949) which was to be presented to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and contained all the legal provisions expected of a federal organisation.

The very brief preamble marks the whole of the proposed work as urgent, reminding readers that this initiative was the only means to “prevent the definitive decline of our civilisation”.

The following points then set out what had thus far been achieved towards the construction of Europe, but which had failed or not gone far enough, namely, the Organisation for European Cooperation/OEEC (considered a failure), European defence, the constitution of a genuine German state, the establishment of a decent “standard of living”, and the aims of a genuine Council of Europe. Their request is then specified: the setting up of a Federal Pact that would “determine the respective competences of the European bodies and the national authorities”, in the purest tradition of constitutional federalism. Finally, the urgency of making a decision is reaffirmed, even if it means allowing the “most willing states” to get involved in the undertaking (in which the principles of a two-speed Europe reappear) 25.

The request thus underlines the importance given to the Council of Europe by the federalists. They saw it as signifying “the beginning of real organic co-operation between European nations, and the end of the illusory belief that Europe could unite without creating supranational political structures” 26. In its resolution of 24 and 26 September 1949, the Central Committee of the EUF had already demonstrated that the unilateral action of the British had been accomplished “without taking into account the requirements of the de facto interdependence of European currencies”, and that it contributed to the “persistent survival of economic nationalism” 27.

However, although the federalists seem to have shown a real desire to discuss Europe’s political structures in the Assembly (which as a new forum was already establishing itself), we can agree with Paul-Henri Spaak, its first president, that the solution they proposed did not necessarily meet with unanimous approval. In his view, three tendencies were apparent from the outset: the convinced federalists (who were in a minority) the “prudent” who envisaged a slow, marked-out progression, and finally those who advocated a cautious alignment with the British position (the majority, which included Spaak) 28. The highly regarded successes of the first session seemed to announce a promising future, which explains why the first reactions of the EUF were generally positive. The fight for a Council of Europe “inspired” by the federalists was therefore the means to harden the resolve of all those in favour of European political structures 29, and this was not an isolated position. The federalists’ demands were really in line with those of the various Western socialist parties, many of whose members were affiliated to the large number of Europeanist movements that multiplied after the war. The parliamentary culture of these parties inclined them to favour the Council of Europe, with its fairly confident vision of future international relations where the “European bloc” could play a role as a third way between the United States and the USSR. For example, in the summer of 1949, the European Manifesto of the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière proclaimed the desire to establish a Federation of Free Peoples based on the election of a European Assembly elected by universal suffrage. It can be assumed that this Assembly would be an emanation of the Council of Europe. Others were more sceptical, such as the newspaper Le Monde, which on 2 November 1949 gave a very broad account of the new federalist strategy and saw the mistake as being a tactical one: “But is the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe really shot through, as Mr Henri Frenay asserts, with a current opposed to timidity and the sterility of purely technical tasks?” 30 In other words, was there any chance of successful action through the Council of Europe? Doubts were even instilled in the Political Resolution of the Central Committee of the EUF dated 22 April 1950, which took stock of the first session of the Council of Europe and identified three specific leanings:

-

The disappointment caused by the classic model of co-operation, which kept “the outdated system of national sovereignties intact”, and the hope of arriving at a system that would make it possible to obtain “a European political authority with limited functions but real powers”.

-

The urgent need for action given specific problems (such as in Trieste and Saarland) as well as more general ones (namely, a divided Germany), but in general to oppose the “totalitarian offensive”, i.e., the Soviet threat, which made itself most sharply felt in Berlin.

-

The need to set up a free and independent European entity, even if it was not an integral one (“an initial federal nucleus”) 31.

The federalists therefore still had hopes for the Council of Europe, but still made it clear that it was no longer in its interests to frustrate their efforts, as evidenced by a standard letter sent by Henri Frenay on 28 July 1950 to all delegates of the Council of Europe on the eve of the opening of their second session 32.

These precautions did not, however, undermine the confidence shown by those federalists who were convinced of the good will of European public opinion, as was demonstrated in their view by the results of various surveys, in particular the Eric Stern survey of 23,000 people in Western Europe commissioned by the European Movement between January and June 1950 33, which gave very favourable responses to the European Union in each of the countries surveyed. Fighting for Europe was therefore tantamount to appropriating all this good will and demonstrating how far behind the states were in this respect. It was this that the EUF wanted to prove to the representatives at the Council of Europe by putting its weight behind the campaign for a Federal Pact. And it is true that this campaign gained satisfactory results, particularly in Italy. Its repercussions were such that, on 6 June 1950, the Senate adopted an agenda pushing for the Council of Europe to take charge of European unification, joining the Chamber of Deputies which had taken the same position a few months before 34. The support of part of the Italian political world was confirmed at the closing event of the campaign at the Palazzo Sistina in Rome on 4 November when Alcide de Gasperi 35, Carlo Sforza and other ministers signed the petition, which was presented to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate the following day [18].