The term artificial intelligence has existed for several decades, but its real boom has been recorded in the last five years due to the development of powerful computing capabilities and advances in the field of algorithms. Historically, artificial intelligence began to take shape in the 1950s, when scientists Alan Turing, John McCarthy and Marvin Minsky laid the scientific and technical foundations of artificial intelligence. The term artificial intelligence was first used by John McCarthy in 1956 at a seminar called the “Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence.” When examining this concept, we are confronted with different opinions, due to the absence of a universal legal definition and the existence of a large number of ideas, definitions, approaches and theories that are either too inclusive or too specific for a particular sector. Currently, there is no global legal definition of artificial intelligence, and we encounter definitions that are more applicable to regional or local clusters of needs. Several developed countries are currently not interested in international regulation of artificial intelligence, while their relations regarding the development of new technologies are marked by competition (USA versus China) for leadership in this area. At the European Union level, early soft-law instruments from 2018 onwards provided descriptive definitions of artificial intelligence. In the communications “Artificial Intelligence for Europe” (COM(2018) 237 final) and “Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence” (COM(2018) 795 final), artificial intelligence was described as “systems that display intelligent behaviour by analysing their environment and taking action—with some degree of autonomy—to achieve specific goals”. These descriptions served as policy guidance rather than binding statutory definitions. By contrast, the binding Artificial Intelligence Act of 2024 does not contain a single exhaustive legal definition of “artificial intelligence” expressis verbis; instead, it defines the operational concepts “artificial intelligence system” (Article 3(1)), “general-purpose artificial intelligence model” (Article 3(63)) and “general-purpose artificial intelligence system” (Article 3(66)). The distinction between early advisory descriptions and the later hard-law classification of systems is therefore important for understanding the evolution of EU regulatory language. When it comes to AI legislation, the United States has chosen a fragmented, industry-specific approach. There is no single overarching federal AI law. Rather, limited federal statutes, agency guidelines, executive orders, voluntary frameworks, and an increasing number of state-level laws have all contributed to the evolution of policy.
We encounter the term
artificial intelligence in various spheres of our private and working lives, as it affects a wide range of areas in public administration, healthcare, banking, education, industry, transport, etc. It is an opportunity and a challenge for society [
1] and at the same time a threat to the violation of fundamental rights and freedoms protected by supranational and national legislation [
2].
The concept of artificial intelligence has existed for several decades, historically, artificial intelligence began to take shape in the 1950s, when scientists such as John McCarthy and Marvin Minsky laid the scientific and technical foundations of artificial intelligence. The term “
artificial intelligence” was introduced by John McCarthy in 1955. The following year he convened the Dartmouth Summer Research Project, widely regarded as the founding event of the field [
3,
4,
5].
But we have been witnessing its real boom over the last five years as a result of the development of powerful computing capacities and progress in the field of algorithms [
6]. As Hamřik [
7] (p. 39) states, “
this term was not only chosen as the 2023 word of the year by one of the English language dictionary publishers [
8]
, but at the same time it is increasingly resonating in public discourse.”
In examining this concept, we are confronted with various views (Encyclopaedia Britannica [
9]; Šufliarsky [
10]; Dobrev [
11]; Meteňkanyč, Gyurász [
12]; Hamřik [
7]; Frankish, Keynes, Ramsey [
13]), due to the absence of a universal legal definition and the existence of a large number of notions, definitions, approaches and theories [
14] that are either too inclusive or too specific to a particular sector [
15]. According to Ivor [
14], it is necessary to distinguish between artificial intelligence as a scientific discipline and artificial intelligence as a project—the result of scientific-research or implementation activity. Rassi [
16] tends to define the term either according to achievable applications or based on scientific principles. As for the requirements that such a definition should meet, Kľučka [
17] (p. 554) emphasizes its inclusiveness, precision, complexity, feasibility and stability; the definition should be neither too “narrow”, since it will not be able to absorb the development of new technologies, the legal regulation will over time begin to “lag behind” and may become obsolete; nor too broad, as this could lead to various interpretive problems in the course of its domestic implementation. According to Scherer [
18] (p. 359), “
the difficulty in defining artificial intelligence lies not in the concept of artificiality but rather in the conceptual ambiguity of intelligence.”At present, there is no global legal definition of artificial intelligence, and we encounter definitions that are valid rather for regional or local groupings of needs. As Hamřik [
7] (p. 54) states, “
in view of the global dimension of artificial intelligence technology, international legal regulation would appear rational,” and according to Kohoutová [
19] (p. 1285) also “
in particular because of the cross-border nature of artificial intelligence.” As Kľučka [
17] (p. 557) emphasizes, several developed states are currently not interested in an international regulation of artificial intelligence, and their relations concerning the development of new technologies are marked by competition (the USA versus China) to gain primacy in this field. Another argument is that even if a new legal regulation were adopted, “
it cannot be ruled out that it will become obsolete even before the ink on its document has dried. Such regulatory gaps exist because the law is unable to keep pace with technological progress, and its gaps are all the greater the faster technological progress is, with this discrepancy being particularly visible in the field of artificial intelligence.”
The aim of this paper is to provide a structured overview of the regulation of artificial intelligence in the European Union and the United States, to compare their distinctive regulatory approaches across successive phases of development, and to discuss the practical implications of these differences for legal certainty, innovation and cross-border compliance.
This entry is adapted from the peer-reviewed paper https://doi.org/10.3390/encyclopedia6100215
