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Subjects:
Criminology & Penology
Emile Durkheim is well known but poorly understood in the disciplines of criminology and criminal justice. His concept of anomie is often oversimplified to mean a state of normlessness. In fact, there are five related conceptions of the concept stated in his works. The purpose of this work is to summarize what is known about relationships between anomie, crime, and punishment. Whereas there is more evidence supporting relationships between anomie and various types of crime, the evidence with regard to the relationship between anomie and punishment is far less clear. This article attempts to provide clarity.
- anomie
- crime
- punishment
Emile Durkheim is one of the most well-known names in criminology, yet he is one of the most understudied theorists [1]. Durkheim is likely most well-known for his discussion of anomie, although the presentation of his theory in criminology has often been oversimplified if not even misstated [2]. As noted by Jones: “Durkheim appears to have suffered the sad fate of being often cited to legitimize a study or argument which promptly goes on to pursue different or only tenuously related theories” [3].
How many of us learned, wrote, and/or presented to students his theory as related to the idea of “normlessness?” For example, Clinard defines anomie as “a state of normlessness” [4] (p. 7). And he claims that it arises with a disruption of collective order causes rising personal aspirations beyond possible fulfillment. Similarly, Collins and Menard define anomie as “a situation of normlessness, in which aspirations, normally regulated by class-specific social norms, exceed the means to satisfy them as a result of a breakdown in the regulation of those aspirations, producing a disjunction between aspirations or goals and the means to achieve them” [5] (p. 423). Such are examples of the oversimplification of his theory and conception of anomie.
Other definitions of anomie give us a better understanding of its meaning. For example, Merton defines anomie as a “breakdown of social standards governing behavior” where there is thus “little social cohesion” in society [6]. Bernard adds that anomie means “a state of deregulation” in society [7]. And Passas points out that anomie is a “pathological phenomenon,” meaning not a normal condition in society [8]. Helpfully, Adler discusses the opposite to anomie—synnomie—which suggests norm conformity in society as well as intact social controls of behavior [9].
There are, in fact, at least five unique, though related, kinds of anomie within Durkheim’s works [10]. These conceptions of anomie will be presented in the literature review of this entry.
But most understand anomie to be related to higher conditions of crime [11]. Logically, with rising levels of crime in the presence of threats to effective informal social controls normally present in a mechanical society, there is a greater need for formal social control in an organic society. Clinard summarizes Durkheimian anomie and suggests that it refers to when a complex division of labor leads to less social cohesion in society—for example, when a society moves from mechanical to organic, there is less collective consciousness. In such conditions, there are less effective contacts between members and less adequate regulation of social relationships [4] (p. 4). Presumably, this means greater enforcement of the criminal law—necessary to assure norms in society—and thus, greater use of punishment.
Yet, DiCristina makes a somewhat surprising claim about anomie and punishment:
Durkehim’s analyses of criminal law center on the variety, precision, and strength of the core sentiments of the collective consciousness. Under normal conditions, criminal law and the punishments it imposes represent and reinforce these sentiments … Therefore, it is suggested that as the core sentiments of the collective consciousness increase in variety, precision, and strength, a wider array of actions will be officially defined and punished as crimes. Conversely, when these sentiments decline in variety, precision, and strength, the number and scope of criminal laws, and the frequency of punishment, should decline. In other words, exceptionally high levels of anomie—that is, a very limited, imprecise, and weak collective consciousness—should result in less crime and less punishment because fewer acts should be defined and treated as crimes [10] (p. 324).
This means that, as anomie increases, enforcement of the criminal law should recede. This is largely because, as the collective conscience is weak, “there would be no strong and well-defined collective sentiments to violate or threaten” [10] (p. 325). This claim is surprising because it has long been posited that conditions of anomie should be associated with higher rates of crime [1], and higher rates of crime ought to produce greater use of punishment. Later in the article, efforts will be made to clarify this issue.
This entry is adapted from the peer-reviewed paper 10.3390/encyclopedia5040199
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