Europe Food Security in the Prolonged Russian–Ukrainian Conflict: Comparison
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Please note this is a comparison between Version 2 by Lindsay Dong and Version 1 by Mohammad Fazle Rabbi.

The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, two major agricultural powers, has numerous severe socio-economic consequences that are presently being felt worldwide and that are undermining the functioning of the global food system. The war has also had a profound impact on the European food system. Indeed, the European agricultural industry is a net importer of several commodities, such as inputs and animal feed. This vulnerability, combined with the high costs of inputs such as fertilizers and energy, creates production difficulties for farmers and threatens to drive up food prices, affecting food affordability and access. Higher input prices increase production costs and, ultimately, inflation. This may affect food security and increase (food) poverty.

  • food security
  • food supply
  • food
  • conflict
  • Russia
  • Ukraine
  • war

1. Introduction

During the past decades, the global food system has faced several crises, including climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic, causing market and supply chain disruption and raising concerns about food security. Consequently, food prices have been increasing since the middle of 2021 due to supply chain disruptions brought on by the pandemic [1], rising global demand, and poor harvests in several countries [2,3][2][3]. Fuel, fertilizer, and pesticide prices have also increased to nearly record levels [4,5][4][5]. Further, the FAO Food Price Index (FFPI) surpassed a new record in February 2022, rising by 2.2% from the previous peak in February 2011 and by 21% in the year prior [6,7][6][7]. Since most European countries depend on imports to meet their energy demand, the continent has seen skyrocketing costs beginning in the summer of 2021. The rise in energy prices hit many of the inputs used by European farmers, such as feed and fertilizers. Hence, annual inflation in the European Union (EU) reached 5.2% in November 2021 (4.9% in the Euro area), 27.5% in the energy sector, and 2.2% in the food, alcohol, and tobacco sector [5].
In the early hours of 24 February 2022, Russia began a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, resulting in civilian casualties and the destruction of vital infrastructure. In addition to significant human fatalities and devastation, the war has jeopardized global food security by disrupting agriculture production and trade in one of the world’s most significant food-exporting regions [8,9,10,11,12][8][9][10][11][12]. It has significantly contributed to rapidly rising global food prices, aggravating existing food system vulnerabilities already worsened by climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic [13,14][13][14]. A year into the conflict, its final military implications and outcomes are unknown [15]. However, its impacts on agricultural production and food security are clear [11,12,16,17][11][12][16][17]. It has caused a severe drop in both countries’ exports and production of essential commodities (e.g., cereals). Their price has soared worldwide, threatening to force millions into famine and poverty, especially in Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (LIFDCs) [11,12,16,17][11][12][16][17]. The European Commission [17] predicted that up to 25 million tons of wheat would need to be substituted to meet global food demands for the current and upcoming seasons.
While Russia and Ukraine contribute just about 2% of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), they are both global breadbaskets, producing and exporting essential agricultural commodities, minerals, fertilizers, and energy [18,19,20][18][19][20]. These countries supply about 30% of globally traded wheat, 20% corn, and 70% sunflower oil. Hence, in 2021, they were among the top three global wheat and corn exporters, accounting for more than 50% and 25% of all sunflower oil sold worldwide [7]. Overall, Russia and Ukraine export around 12% of the global total caloric trade [4]. Furthermore, before the conflict, Russia was the world’s largest supplier of fertilizers (such as nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus) and one of the leading oil and natural gas exporters, owing to its vast reserves [10,21,22,23][10][21][22][23].
Accordingly, the conflict dealt a considerable blow to commodity markets, particularly food, fertilizers, and energy, impacting global trade, production, and consumption patterns in ways that will keep prices at historic highs until the end of 2024, jeopardizing global food security [11,12][11][12]. Higher energy, input, and food prices might considerably impact global food security, particularly in vulnerable countries. Because of the interdependence inherent in international trade, the broader repercussions are felt throughout the globe in today’s hyper-connected global economy with its deep trade ties [24]. According to the World Bank [24], in January 2023, maize and wheat prices were 27% and 13% higher, respectively, than in January 2021, while rice price was 10% lower. Therefore, between September and December 2022, 94.1% of low-income nations, 92.9% of lower-middle-income countries, and 89% of upper-middle-income countries had inflation exceeding 5%, with several having double-digit inflation [25]. High inflation is also prevalent in high-income countries, including some in Europe, with around 85.5% suffering high food price inflation [26].
The conflict has also significantly affected the European food system, which was already dealing with interrupted supply lines due to the COVID-19 outbreak [27]. The food supply in the EU is not jeopardized, since most European countries benefit from well-developed agricultural production and are mostly self-sufficient in many products. However, the European agricultural sector is a net importer of specific products, such as animal feed. This vulnerability, combined with the high costs of inputs such as fertilizers and energy, creates production difficulties for farmers and threatens to drive up food prices, affecting food availability and access [28]. Indeed, the substantial dependence of some European nations on the Russian energy supply makes it hard to avoid price increases on essential items such as food [29]. This increases producer costs and affects food prices, raising worries over consumer purchasing power and producer income. Inflation affects the price of basic commodities, particularly for low-income households, for whom the affordability of nutritious meals was already a challenge before the start of the conflict [29]. The conflict highlighted the European food system’s vulnerabilities, such as its dependence on imported energy, fertilizer, and animal feed [18]. In 2019, Russia supplied the European Union with over 40% of its natural gas, 25% of its oil, and almost 50% of its coal [30].
After decades of low inflation, the EU faces new economic, political, and social challenges from increasing consumer prices. Rising energy and food prices are already generating high societal costs in terms of decreased buying power. They are also anticipated to exacerbate material deprivation, poverty, and social exclusion throughout the EU [31]. The next several months will be among the most challenging in modern history for the European and global agri-food sectors [10]. Although futures prices have gone down and international markets have adjusted and adapted, there is a possibility of a short-term inflation increase due to the delayed transmission of previous food and energy price increases from global commodity markets to consumer prices. For instance, the IMF [31] predicts that global inflation will climb from 4.7% in 2021 to 8.8% in 2022 before falling to 6.5% in 2023 and 4.1% in 2024. In Europe, the effects are compounded by the significant impact of war-related energy shocks [31].

2. Food Security Challenges in the Prolonged Russian–Ukrainian Conflict

2.1. Threats Posed by War and Other Disruptions to Food Security

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has undermined important food security tenets. Wars and military conflicts put countries at risk of international trade disruptions, particularly those that depend on imports of critical commodities such as oil and food [16]. Armed conflicts may negatively impact food security by generating shortages of upstream and downstream outputs, hurting food production, commercialization, and stock management [56][32]. War and violence continue to be the primary cause of hunger, with 60% of the world’s hungry population residing in regions affected by conflict. Further, in today’s globalized world, military conflicts may exacerbate food insecurity in regions beyond the battlefield [35][33]. Due to wars, a country’s agricultural production can be drastically reduced if crops cannot be planted, weeded, or harvested [57][34].
Farmers in Ukraine’s conflict-prone areas lost livestock, food supplies, and other assets, disrupting food market supply in these and other surrounding regions and neighboring countries. The destruction of civil infrastructure and the presence of mines and Unexploded Ordnances (UXOs) coupled with limitations on the movement of people and goods have made it difficult for farmers to tend to their fields, harvest their crops, and sell their livestock products [58][35]. Additionally, with conscription and population displacement, there was a significant labor shortage. Fertilizers and other critical agricultural inputs are becoming more limited, exacerbating the situation [15]. Further, the conflict-affected regions, such as Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, account for a significant portion of Ukraine’s pre-war output, with 25% of barley, 16% of sunflower seed, 20% of rapeseed, and 20% of wheat [59][36]. According to assessments, the conflict would cost farmers and agricultural corporations USD 28.3 billion this year in lost income, damage to farming machinery, equipment, storage facilities, livestock, and crops, and increased transportation costs [60][37].
The conflict’s effects on global issues are too early to be determined, but it is evident they will be multifaceted [61][38]. The conflict has prompted widespread international concern over a global food crisis and its potential effects on food security (Figure 21). Indeed, a growing body of the literature shows that the war has affected food security at different levels and scales [12[12][17][23][39][40][41][42][43][44][45][46][47][48][49][50][51][52][53],17,23,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54], especially in developing countries that rely on food imports [12,42,44,45,51][12][41][43][44][50] and for some commodities such as wheat [47,52,53][46][51][52]. However, it seems that the impacts of the war have not been alike on the four pillars of food security. Furthermore, the extent of the war’s impact on the food security pillars will be determined by its length and the outcomes of the different scenarios.
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Figure 21.
Ukrainian–Russian conflict and its consequences on food security pillars. Source: developed by the authors.

2.1.1. Availability

Ukraine has long been renowned as “Europe’s breadbasket” because of its abundance of “Chernozem”, or black soil, considered the most fertile farmland in the world, and has a high producing potential. Ukraine’s agricultural land area totals 41 million hectares, with 33 million hectares being arable, the equivalent of one-third of the EU’s total arable land area [62][54]. A significant fall in agricultural production and supply followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and Russia and Ukraine became net importers of food [63][55]. However, Russian and Ukrainian agro-food output and exports have expanded considerably during the last three decades due to intense modernization and automation, making the region the world’s breadbasket [19]. In 2021, Russia and Ukraine exported nearly 12% of the food calories traded globally, making them essential actors in the global agri-food sector [23]. They are significant producers of staple agro-commodities such as wheat, corn, and sunflower oil and Russia is the largest exporter of fertilizers in the world. Further, Ukraine is one of the top three grain exporters, leading the world in soybean and sunflower oil exports. Ukraine controls 52.2% of the global sunflower oil market. Ukrainian agricultural exports have acquired a rising reputation in China, Egypt, India, Turkey, and the European Union [64][56].

As a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, global markets were disrupted. Short-term disruptions in global grain supply and long-term effects on natural gas and fertilizer markets negatively impacted producers during the planting season. This disruption might exacerbate already high food price inflation, posing a significant threat to low-income net food importers, many of whom have suffered a rise in malnutrition rates due to the pandemic disruptions [4].

Further, some issues will impact the 2023 harvest due to rising seed, transport, and fuel costs combined with low grain selling prices [68][57]. For instance, the transportation costs to ports have increased by over 100%, and the substitute option, which involves truck transport to Romania, costs nearly four times as much [69][58]. Accordingly, the sowing of winter wheat has decreased by 17% compared with the harvested area of 2022, while the estimated area for maize cultivation is reduced by 30% to 35% [67][59]. As a result, in 2023, Ukraine’s grain production and exports are anticipated to diminish by 20% and 15% compared with 2022. 

In Europe, the food supply is not jeopardized since most European countries benefit from well-developed agricultural production. Except for tropical items (such as fruit, coffee, and tea), oilseeds (particularly soya), and natural fats and oils (including palm oil), the EU is self-sufficient in most food products [74][60]. The EU is generally self-sufficient in essential agricultural crops, including wheat and barley (which it is a net exporter of), maize, and sugar. The EU is also self-sufficient in a variety of animal products, including dairy and meat products, as well as fruits and vegetables [5]. Although Russia’s Ukraine conflict and climate change affect output, the EU’s food system remains robust and reliable. However, essential goods, such as animal feed, are net imported by the European agricultural industry. Due to this vulnerability and the high input costs, such as those for energy and fertilizers, farmers face productivity challenges and risk having food prices rise. This would reduce access to and availability of food [28]. Indeed, the substantial dependence of some European nations on the Russian energy supply makes it hard to avoid price increases on essential items such as food [29]. Ukraine was a key exporter of corn to Euro countries before the start of the conflict, accounting for 42% of EU grain imports in 2019, 30.5% in 2020, and 29.1% in 2021. Vegetable fat and oil imports from Ukraine were also significant, making up about 24% of EU imports between 2019 and 2021 before the crisis. Meanwhile, before the conflict, Russia accounted for approximately one-fifth of EU inorganic fertilizer imports. With the extensive usage of fertilizers in the EU, this may be destabilizing [29].

2.1.2. Accessibility

This pillar comprises variables that measure infrastructures for bringing food to market, individual indicators of people’s access to calories, and affordability of purchasing nutritional food. Accordingly, market disruption and rising inflation may put the food accessibility pillar in jeopardy [55][61]. Due to the Ukraine–Russia war, it will become even more difficult for some European low-income households to afford food.

The food supply in the EU is not jeopardized since most European countries benefit from well-developed agricultural production. Indeed, the EU is a significant producer of agri-food products—it was the world’s largest trader in 2021—and, although Russia’s conflict in Ukraine and climate change affect output, the EU’s food system remains robust and reliable. However, inflation and increased food prices affect EU citizens [76][62]. The steep rise in energy prices following the conflict impacts agriculture, an energy-intensive industry. Additionally, despite the recent price drops, the cost of fertilizers and other energy-intensive goods has remained high due to the war. Increased input costs translate into higher production expenses, thus raising food prices [23]. Accordingly, accessibility and affordability are the main consequences of the conflict on food security, especially for low-income and vulnerable populations that are disproportionately impacted [76][62].

Moreover, inflation caused by the conflict might cut private consumption by 1.1% in the European Union in 2022. However, the effect would vary by country. The impact will be felt more acutely in nations where consumption is more sensitive to energy and food costs and where a sizable proportion of the population is vulnerable to poverty. Central and south-eastern European countries are disproportionately impacted [82][63]. Europeans continuously feel the strain of the rise in food prices and the high inflation rate. As a result, many European citizens are losing buying power of necessary commodities. For instance, even Germany, which has solid domestic production and does not rely much on Ukrainian exports, is very susceptible to escalating inflation, driven mainly by the rising cost of Russian energy and fertilizer [29]. In November 2022, Germany’s consumer price index (CPI) year-over-year change was 10.0%. This was a modest decrease in the inflation rate from the +10.4% seen in October 2022. In November 2022, food prices increased by 21.1% compared with November 2021. This inflation rate is more than twice as high as the rate of general price inflation. The annual rate of inflation for food has been steadily climbing since January (October 2022: +20.3%). In November of 2022, prices increased across the board for all types of food. Edible fats and oils had the most significant price increase at 41.5%; dairy products and eggs increased by 34.0%; bread and cereals increased by 21.1%; vegetables increased by 21.1% [83][64].

2.1.3. Utilization

This pillar tracks anthropometric and other measures of people’s ability to use calories; related measures include wasting, stunting, and low weight among children. Russia’s war in Ukraine harmed the food utilization pillar, resulting in a lack of nutritional variety and malnutrition.
In addition to the 780 to 811 million people who experienced chronic hunger in 2020, FAO predicts that, in 2022 and 2023, there will be an additional 7.6 million to 13.1 million undernourished people due to Russia’s war in Ukraine [18]. The nutritional variety substantially impacts EU citizens’ health [26]. Since healthy variety or dietary diversity is a fundamental requirement for people to obtain all essential nutrients, it can be used as one of the core indicators for examining food habits and the productivity of people. Hence, chronic hunger in the EU is associated with undernourishment, indicative of a productivity decline.

2.1.4. Stability

Since the outbreak of the Ukrainian conflict, Europe’s economic growth forecasts have been lowered downward, while inflation forecasts have risen. Most current predictions, which account for increased uncertainty and commodity price shocks, indicate that real GDP growth in the European Union might fall far below 3% in 2022, a drop of more than 1.3 percentage points from pre-war expectations. Additional supply chain disruptions and economic penalties are expected to send the European economy into a recession [82][63]. There has already been a substantial economic impact on European consumers due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, posing political risks to incumbent governments. Rising inflation, higher food prices, and food insecurity result in protests and strikes across Europe, underscoring growing discontent with skyrocketing living costs and threatening political turmoil.

As of January 2023, the slowdown in the global economy and fears of a worldwide recession have contributed to a general lowering of commodity prices. Nevertheless, commodity prices remain high relative to historical averages, extending the challenges connected with food security. Lower input costs, especially for fertilizers, are expected to contribute to a 5% drop in agricultural prices in 2023. Despite these forecasts, prices are projected to stay higher than pre-pandemic levels. As a result, global inflation will remain high in 2023 at 5.2% before decreasing to 3.2% in 2024. Although inflation is expected to decline gradually during 2023, underlying inflationary pressures may become more persistent [25]. According to the International Monetary Fund [94][65], global food prices are anticipated to stay high due to conflict, energy costs, and weather events, despite interest rate rises marginally easing pricing pressures.

2.2. Reshaping EU Food Security Amid the War Crisis

In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Parliament adopted a comprehensive resolution on 24 March 2022, endorsing many of the initiatives included in the European Commission’s package and calling for an urgent EU action plan to secure food security both inside and outside the EU [95][66]. EU leaders endorsed short-term and medium-term measures at the state levels to protect food security and strengthen the resilience of food systems. Most actions may be carried out using the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). The EU members emphasized the importance of maintaining food supply security and took some immediate actions:

EU farmers support a package worth EUR 500 million to safeguard food security and strengthen the resilience of food systems. ● Reduction of energy import dependency and price shocks through REPowerEU plans. ● Maintaining the EU single market by avoiding restrictions and bans on exports. ● The Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) provides food and essential material support worth EUR 3.8 billion. ● Using the new CAP strategic plans to decrease reliance on gas, fuel, and inputs such as pesticides and fertilizers. ● A unique and temporary exception to enable the cultivation of any crops for food and feed on fallow land while farmers retain the full amount of the greening payment. ● Specific temporary exemptions from current animal feed import regulations  [96,97,98,99][67][68][69][70]. Further strategies are needed to safeguard food security and bring resilience to the food system. The war has exposed the global food system’s fragility, emphasizing the significance of rebuilding the food system to strengthen resilience to future shocks, crises, and stressors [101][71]. As shown in Figure 52, several approaches are required, such as increasing food aid, ensuring fertilizer supply, imposing an energy price cap, initiating a farmer support package, switching to renewable energy sources for cultivation, changing individual food behaviors, lifting a trade ban, and political stability.
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Figure 52.
Actions for ensuring food security and strengthening food system resilience. Source: developed by authors.

 

The food availability pillar has been jeopardized during Russia’s armed confrontation with Ukraine. As a result, the EU needs enough fertilizer at a reasonable price to make agricultural production more efficient to safeguard the food availability pillar. Maintaining equity in fertilizer access is a powerful lever for reducing food insecurity concerns in the short term. In the longer term, fair fertilizer usage must be supplemented with efforts to guarantee sustainable fertilizer use, ecosystem protection, and emission reductions [102][72]. However, export restrictions and bans must be avoided to preserve the EU single market. This will allow the EU and vulnerable countries to maintain a secure food supply. Food insecurity is the inability to consistently obtain adequate food to maintain an active and healthy lifestyle. On the contrary, food security can be established only through easy access to food, which the war has already impacted. The EU member states should impose a price cap on food to prevent adverse effects from market anomalies. Consequently, food would be more affordable and accessible to the EU people. In addition, the government needs to increase food aid to support the most vulnerable citizens in the EU. Furthermore, price caps can reduce inflation rates in the EU, which can promote food accessibility. Several measures can be taken to ensure food utilization, including minimizing food waste and loss, eating a healthy diet, or recycling food. Foods derived from plants are transformed into culinary creations that satisfy hunger, provide nutrients, and alleviate obesity. Indeed, adopting plant-based diets across Europe may boost food resilience in the face of the Russia–Ukraine war [27]. Households must always have access to adequate food to be food secure. In case of a sudden shock, such as a climatic or economic crisis or a war, they should not risk losing access to food. The armed conflict involving Russia in Ukraine impacts food stability in the EU and beyond. This situation requires a reduction in the interest rate to reduce food import prices and a reduction in Value-Added Tax (VAT), which is an alternative solution. Energy price caps protect consumers who default on basic energy tariffs from their suppliers. Putting a cap on energy prices ensures that businesses and individuals will pay a fair price, limiting food inflation, import costs, and retail prices. The significant trade-related impact of the war causes an increase in commodity prices. Indeed, energy, food products, and metals are three major commodities impacted by the war. Consequently, the significant price hike affects global markets and supply chains. Furthermore, commodity price hikes coupled with higher inflation rates on a global scale could result in changes in demand because people are unable or unwilling to make the usual food purchases. Furthermore, in the short term, measures aimed at preserving and expanding trade routes from Ukraine, enabling greater food production in vulnerable countries, and reducing harmful consumption in the EU are most adapted to addressing the present issues.  While short-term solutions may mitigate the crisis’ negative effect, a long-term and systemic approach is required to strengthen its resilience [102][72]. As the European Commission [103][73] outlined, improving resilience through minimizing European agriculture’s reliance on energy, energy-intensive imports, and feed imports is more critical than ever. Resilience necessitates diverse import sources and market outlets through a solid global and bilateral trade strategy. Consequently, the Commission has asked member states to consider revising their Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) strategic plans to boost the sector’s resilience, increase renewable energy output, and decrease reliance on synthetic fertilizers via more sustainable production methods [103][73]. 

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