The impacts of climate change on socio-economic and environmental aspects have now become a global concern [1]. Climate change impacts have significant implications on exacerbating existing inequalities, and they are driving those with poor adaptive capacity into deeper conditions of vulnerability to shocks and stresses ^[2][3][2,3]. It has indeed become a social justice issue, and the late recognition of this state of affairs is indicative of both global and national failures to formulate and implement adequate adaptation policies and strategies which build the resilience of those most affected by it [4].

It is no exaggeration to argue that the most vulnerable groups to climate change lack a voice to influence and participate in any policy-making processes [5]. Their lived experiences and the challenges associated with extreme weather events are often unconsidered and unrepresented in many climate change intervention measures implemented by governments ^[6][7][8][6,7,8]. This exacerbates their position of vulnerability, in as much as they are the groups in society who have done the least to trigger changes in climatic conditions ^{[9][10][11][12][13][14]}[9,10,11,12,13,14]. Thus, paying attention to how adaptation policies and strategies are developed, by way of considering who influences the nature of these intervention measures and who participates in their formation, is a moral grounding issue to climate change governance [15]. 

While there is a rich presence of literature focusing on rights-based analysis and emphasising a human rights approach to adaptation policy development, the pathways to comprehensive and/or transformative participation largely remain under-researched and misunderstood ^[16][17]. There is, therefore, an urgent need to move away from the instrumentalist approaches of participation and towards a system which aids in identifying conduits for realising participatory rights for different groups of the voiceless, highlighting opportunities and exposing barriers to participation at multiple scales. Such a process would bring adaptation decision-making closer to those most negatively impacted by climate change ^{[17][18][19][20]}[18,19,20,21]. The current, centralized structures of governance and decision-making, which to be honest, were created and designed to deal with other social and economic challenges, and which must now address climate changes issues, need to be reformed, aligned, and tailored to deal with contemporary, climate-induced problems in specific contexts [5]. The one-size-fits-all governance approach cannot be applied to understanding the impacts of climate change on different groups of people and in diverse geographical locations ^[21][22].

Climate change is a cross-cutting issue that affects all sub-sectors of an economy and presents different challenges to social, economic, and environmental systems ^[22][24]. It has been conclusively argued that, although climate change is a global concern, its impacts are disproportionally felt by the poor people living in the poor countries of the world ^[23][24][25,26]. Sub-Saharan Africa has been identified and is projected to be a region that will and is most susceptible and vulnerable to climate change impacts due, in part, to a large presence of poor people on the continent, weak institutional and policy frameworks, a lack of infrastructure, stagnation, deterioration in the economic systems, and a general lack of political will ^[25][26][27,28]. Furthermore, Africa suffers from low levels of technological advancement, education, rapid population growth, high rates of poverty, and a lack of social safety nets ^{[17][18][19][20]}[18,19,20,21]. These biophysical, political, and socioeconomic stresses interact to heighten the region’s susceptibility to climate change, despite emitting the lowest levels of greenhouse gases in the world ^{[23][27][28][29][30]}[25,29,30,31,32].

Adger et al. [6] argue that climate change does not only disturb the livelihoods of poor people, but it also compromises the economic growth and national development of countries, particularly those in the developing south. A study by van der Bank and Karsten ^[22][24], observes that in countries with poor and weak economic systems and policy frameworks, the impacts of climate change always have far-and-wide-ranging effects, and these tend to affect and subject the poor to unprecedented levels of risk to environmental hazards. Pielke et al. ^[31][33] further observe that recognising the inevitable impacts of climate change on poor people and the economies of poor countries is a vital first step in identifying and developing appropriate and strategic policy frameworks for supporting climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives. Edifying these observations, Kurukulasuriya and Mandelsohn ^[32][34], as well as Smit and Skinner ^[33][35], advocate for pro-poor climate change adaptation policies and strategies that are based on the realities that confront poor people, and which have strong scientific bases. Furthermore, Challinor ^[34][36], supported by Niang et al. ^[35][37], is of the view that any pro-poor adaptation initiatives must support the livelihoods of those who are most vulnerable to climate change by finding effective strategies to cope with environmental changes by addressing the local and institutional barriers to the use of these strategies. In the same vein, Averchenkova [5] posits that the capacity of civil society to engage in climate change and to influence decisions seems to be generally weak in developing countries, particularly for the rural poor communities, as they have both limited resources and a limited capacity to engage. Thus, an issue-based perspective to adaptation must be the focal point in searching for an alternative perspective to the often-common bottom-up and top-down approaches, which are always the two dominant paradigms in adaptation discourses.

While it is important to consider these approaches, it is also imperative to cogitate the need for community mobilisation and participation in adaptation policy discussions, as pro-poor adaptation initiatives require that the myriad spatial contexts in which the poor live are taken into consideration ^[36][37][38,39]. This assertion, therefore, speaks to the importance of those mandated to formulate adaptation policies and strategies to recognize the ability of the poor to adapt to the impacts of climate change without pre-conceived assumptions. Reid and Simatele ^[38][40], for example, argue that national and local government institutions and authorities must recognize the important role that community engagement and mobilisation play in developing a comprehensive model for climate change adaptation. Cheru ^[39][41], on the other hand, argues that institutional and policy bureaucracy oftentimes tend to hamper the formulation of progressive policies to change the misery in which the poor live. Ribot et al. ^[40][42] elucidate this observation by arguing that institutional and policy frameworks can fundamentally constrain the capacity of the poor to adapt to external and internal stressors because institutions control the distribution of resources, which are the basis of any adaptation initiatives and efforts. They argue that extreme weather events are: “…not risks which are unknown… and it is not that the methods for coping do not exist… rather it is the inability of those most affected to cope to the impacts due to the lack of—or systematic alienation from accessing resources needed to guard against these events” ^[40][42] (p. 34).

Climate change is a complex phenomenon and generates multifaceted, distinct, and dynamic impacts in societies. These impacts cannot be addressed by using a silo approach, but rather, they require the application of myriad systems, approaches, and technologies. Jordan et al. ^[41][43], for example, are of the view that any single entity or actor is inadequately equipped to address and resolve challenges arising from changes in climatic conditions. This assertion, therefore, suggests that any attempts or efforts to formulate a response to the challenges of climate change require the adoption and implementation of holistic approaches, which are driven by a needs-based system, and which involve the participation of all stakeholders ^[42][44]. The unprecedented pace at which the world’s climate is changing and impacting society requires that government institutions and instruments take a key posture of facilitating community initiatives and embracing all stakeholders in decision-making processes [5]. It is now obvious that self-ruling or self-regulated societal adaptation operating in silos is not sufficient, and governments must now play an active role in promoting collaborative systems in the search for solutions that bring about transformative adaptation to climate change ^[43][44][45,46]. This will further require significant changes in governance systems and processes; from the current bureaucratic ones to ones that ensure that government effectively interacts and builds effective, cooperative alliances with communities and the private sector ^[45][47] (pp. 83–104). The success or failure of societies, communities, and households in adapting to the impacts of climate change is highly dependent on the nature and effectiveness of governance ^[36][46][38,48]. Filho et al. ^[27][29] argue that a key factor in enhancing climate adaptation is the strengthening of institutions and implementation of well-designed national and city-level planning policies and governance systems.

An effective and efficient governance system is a noble dashboard indicator for measuring the preparedness of any government entity to climate change challenges c. ^[47][49]. Chhotray and Stoker ^[48][50] and Richards and Smith ^[49][51] are of the view that a comprehensive and effective governance system which fosters the principles and values of stakeholder engagement and participation provides more opportunities for cultivating an inclusive platform for generating rich discussions and policy options. Gillard et al. ^[50][52] and Termeer et al. ^[51][53] further observe that, while centralised systems of governance can facilitate the coordination and prevent overlapping and duplication of programmes and the allocation of resources, they can also potentially prohibit experimental learning, trust-building, and collaborative management, and disregard local priorities and context sensitivities ^[52][53][54,55]. Thus, Armitage et al. ^[54][56] advocate for the breakdown of systems and processes which act as barriers for promoting the inclusive engagement and participation of various stakeholders, including grass-roots communities, in the identification of solutions to problems that affect them.

Binns et al. ^[19][20] and Cheru ^[39][41] argue that governments must move away from the naivety of believing that they are better placed to make key decisions on behalf of the poor people and to steer community development. On the contrary, they must pay attention to the critical responsibilities and energy that the poor in local communities expend in resolving the myriad socio-economic and environmental problems they encounter daily. Alemaw and Simatele ^[55][16] argue that a characteristic challenge to the adaptation agenda of poor people is not the scale of their socio-economic status, but the weakness of national and local government institutions and governance systems in the face of unprecedented impacts arising from climate and environmental changes. At all levels of government, a lack of resources and knowledge has tended to prevent people and institutions from solving problems and mapping change triggered by climate change ^[55][16]. This situation has further resulted in the absence of any comprehensive climate change adaptation intervention measures and has destabilised the productivity of the poor ^[56][57]. Mubaya and Mafongoya ^[57][58] observe that a lack of transparency and inclusivity in policy discussions almost always results in the marginalisation and the disenfranchisement of the poor and those with little or no political or financial power to influence the direction of any policy formulation.

Despite the frequent exclusion of the poor from participating in policy discussions, existing literature suggests that, if given the right impetus and empowered to define their development, they can resolve many of the challenges they face ^[56][57]. Hsieh and Lee ^[58][59] argue that cultivating the participation of local people in decision-making always has the benefit of stimulating the achievement of several important objectives, among which are fostering a greater sense of commitment, involvement, and ownership of the resolutions reached; and second, delivering adaptation services which are much needed by the community. Edifying this observation, Hove et al. ^[59][60] are of the view that there is an urgent need to shift the paradigm of policy engagement from a top-down narrative to one which promotes and is based on a strong and genuine grass-roots-grown and -driven process. Simatele et al. ^[36][38], on the other hand, argue that a people-centred approach, through community involvement, can create sensitivity to, and enhance the nature of, the adaptation strategies which the poor can use to build their adaptive capacity and resilience to climate-induced, environmental changes. Zeidler et al. ^[60][61] further observe that any national strategy for building the resilience of the poor to climate change must be conducive and aligned to local conditions and the coping mechanisms or adaptation practices employed by the local people, which are usually rooted in indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) and community-based innovation. Kettle et al. ^[61][62] and Coffey and O’Toole ^[62][63] therefore advocate the urgency of obtaining governmental and non-governmental actors to embrace traditional practices, which are ingrained in IKS, in their advisory services so as to formulate robust adaptation options for the targeted audiences.

A major challenge to the formulation of transformative climate change adaptation lies in what Leck and Simon ^[63][64] have deemed the “siloed and hierarchical approach” to climate change governance. They argue that, historically, this approach tends to negatively counter the connectedness and collaboration required for the development of more transformative systems and processes for community adaptation. The multidimensional challenges associated with climate change necessitate the need for collaboration and partnerships across multiple sectors, scales, and actors, so as to address climate change problems ^[55][16]. Thus, a more integrated approach to adaptation offers better opportunities to formulate comprehensive systems of climate change coordination and response vis-à-vis adaptation action ^[64][65][66][65,66,67]. Improving collaboration between governmental agencies and other stakeholders, including local communities, can aid in the effectiveness and efficiency of adapting knowledge delivery to end-users ^[64][65]. Evidence suggests that facilitating localised collaborations between municipalities and higher levels of government contributes to extending interventions beyond one geographical scale, as well as to integration across policy scales ^[55][63][16,64]. The potential for multi-stakeholder partnerships to adopt a flexible, decentralised, and inclusive structure ^[67][68][71,72] appeals—theoretically at least—to the idea that adaptation should be implemented locally, where vulnerability is experienced ^[69][73]. A combination of leadership, local government support, and stakeholder buy-in has been proven to be necessary to implement adaptation measures which meet the aspirations of the communities most affected by climate change ^[70][71][74,75].

Kalafatis et al. ^[72][76] and Ochieng ^[73][77] further argue that improving communication can significantly enhance knowledge uptake. A considerable body of literature from developing and developed countries emphasises the need for reliable and comprehensive climate change communication to influence the sharing and shaping of knowledge in adaptation and decision-making ^{[74][75][76][77][78][79][80][81][82]}[78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86]. Kvamsås ^[83][87] observes that, even though the growing body of scientific knowledge does not lead to growing consistency in societal attention, political commitment, or state interventions ^[84][88], knowledge connects climate adaptation and local political agendas, influencing priorities and anchoring decisions. Undoubtedly, there is still much to be done to improve the supply of robust knowledge to policymakers and practitioners to enhance communities’ capacities to adapt to climate change. Institutional capacity is the strongest predictor of national adaptation policies and action ^[85][89]. Evidence suggests that an effective governance system which cuts across sectoral and multilevel endeavours is vital for the efficient coordination of different climate change actors, and that development is a comprehensive and forward-looking adaptation agenda ^[86][87][90,91]. Mapfumo et al. ^[88][92] highlight the importance of political will and political feasibility to undertake coordinated measures of a transformational nature in response to the threats of severe climate impacts. In conclusion, therefore, it can be argued that leaders at all levels of society play a role as brokers, often as the glue that brings together different societal actors, thus enabling not only committed and effective community participation, but also assigning to that participation a meaningful place in governance ^[89][90][93,94]. Thus, the development of any climate change adaptation intervention measures and strategies requires the setting into motion of several considerations, among which the inclusive engagement and participation of different stakeholders and communities are paramount.