The World Bank and other international donor communities have often supported decentralization of natural resource management (NRM) based on the assumption that it would bring governance down to local level actors and generate a range of positive outcomes, including ecological sustainability and poverty reduction. Ghana makes an interesting case study to critically analyze the intertwined relationship among decentralization policy, mining title formalization, and CRAFT because of the prominent role that they play in current NRM practices. Like many Sub-Saharan African countries, the exploitation of gold ore in Ghana is shaped by three main sources of formal rules, including public policies, mining concession, and customary law. Customary law governs surface land rights while statutory laws and regulations govern subterranean mineral resources, leading to a situation where gold ore mining is the result of the interactions of customary law and government laws and regulations. This affects the governance and coordination of mineral wealth exploitation, which can positively or negatively affect resource sustainability.
[1]
[5]
[1]
[8]
[10]
[13]
[14]
[12]
[15]
[16]
In Ghana, the MMDAs and local communities had high expectations for the establishment of a district-level MC to provide doorstep services. Nevertheless, this process was challenged by the central government’s inventive use of neoliberal resource governance to reinforce tendencies associated with neopatrimonial political culture to undertake a series of complex fiscal and administrative interventions that aim to disempower the MMDAs. In the context of ASM, the state implemented a selective decentralization reform and concurrently enacted Act 703 where the authority to administer and dispose of mineral resources wealth is now taken over by the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources and is administered by the MC. Act 703 provides for a clear-cut system of mineral resource governance where the Minister has several mineral tenurial instruments at his/her disposal to issue mining rights. He/she directs the MC to identify ASM areas in the district and to perform the technical and commercial evaluation of the area. Thereafter, he/she directs ASM operators to make claims to the mineral resource wealth area by obtaining a small-scale license from him/her (Act 703, Section 82). It seems that the centralized control over mineral resource wealth in the national government stimulated interest among foreign mining companies, leading to a dramatic increase in mining applications in the last decade.
As such, the Minister takes advantage of his public position for political-economic considerations by relegating the MMDAs, which are mandated to implement national government policies including law enforcement. In 2017, the Minister instituted a moratorium on ASM for two consecutive years on the backdrop of national media environmental conservation discourse. Subsequently, a national taskforce—militarized enforcement initiative—was established to enforce the moratorium. The taskforce entered the MMDAs territories and undertook operations, resulting in the destruction of mining assets. Since October 2017, local miners have lobbied the Ghanaian President through the Council of State and National House of Chiefs to lift the moratorium because of the loss of employment, income, and livelihoods. Subsequently, the Minister lifted the ban, vetted ~900 miners, and recommenced the issuance of mining licenses.
The widespread scars of explosives on the land surface include opened pits, deforestation, encroaching desertification, and the dramatic transformation of stream and hand-dug wells. Residents also informed us that children and livestock frequently fall inside abandoned pits and die, if unnoticed early. Local elites, such as the gold committees, do not enforce land reclamation after mining the gold ore from the soil because their livelihoods do not depend on farming or livestock keeping. Field observation results show that the streams receive a greater load of mine sediment and contamination of hazardous chemicals, sewage, and solid waste from adjacent mining sites. An elevated level of mercury in the water in mining communities is above that of the recommended World Health Organization for potable drinking water [20][38]. Residents said that the stream is rendered unsuitable for both animal watering and domestic use. We are informed that in the raining season (May–September), the swollen stream deposits toxic silt immediately next to the bank, which contributes to rendering the floodplain unproductive for dry season gardening. The vast floodplain surprisingly looks infertile and native grass species are stunted and look scorched [9]. In the past, the land immediately next to the stream was the most productive, yielding 21 bags of maize per acre for peasants, but now it supports no plant or animal life. Presently, Indigenous people make claims to the best lands and build plots for themselves, while the less desirable land closest to the stream is reserved for poor settlers [9].
Majority of local community members perceive informal ASM as a major income source, which increase their capacity to establish new local businesses and pay school and health fees of household members. However, the scale of environmental degradation arising from informal ASM has affected the aquatic ecosystem and worsened agricultural production for people whose livelihood does not depend on mining. In the past decade, locals catch low fish and do not obtain eggs from endangered crocodile species for subsistence and income. Additionally, the presence of heavy metals in the streams increases the costs of water treatment for locals. Household wells nearby the stream and mining sites are contaminated due to discharge from mine sites. Nearly, 84% of local community members reported not having access to potable water from within. The onerous task is that women and children from poor households trek far to fetch water for domestic use. The 16% of local community members buy bottled and bagged water for household daily needs. The ability of miners to be resilient during the COVID-19 pandemic was reduced as many women and children who worked as cooks, transporters, and crushers lost employment and generated no cash to buy food for consumption during the lockdown (March–September 2020). Those who had money could not buy food locally because farmlands had been converted into mining.
The study results indicate that the differential distribution in money causes problems, including behavioral indiscipline in schools. Usually, pupils (12–17 years) who participate in informal ASM show disrespect to their teachers and community elders who attempt to prohibit them from working in informal ASM. The additional money pupils make is often spent on attending weddings, parties, and casinos, thus resulting in less time to stay home to do homework exercises/assignments. The advantage of boys going down narrow tunnels to collect gold ore endows them with a powerful role in informal ASM, while girls and women transport the ore to crush for milling. However, they face harsh working conditions, lack job security and safety materials, abuse drugs (e.g., tramadol, marijuana, alcohol) to work harder, and face threats and intimidation from their employers. This arises due to a lack of contractual agreements and lack of collective efforts to unionize labor, which has contributed to tension between mine workers and owners.
In this section, we go back to our working hypotheses (see Section 5) to discuss them, keeping in mind the comparative results of the two case studies. As a first step, we recall that our H1 states that decentralization in NRM will lead to positive social and environmental outcomes. The proponents of decentralization hold the assumption that local enfranchisement in NRM will lead to an improvement in social and environmental standards, which will maintain crucial ecological functions and simultaneously safeguard essential livelihoods and the economic values of resources. Any positive outcome of decentralization is largely dependent on the distribution of power, a set of management rules attributed to the concerned resource, equity in benefit sharing, and the performance of downward accountability toward the local population [13][22].
Our empirical case study results do not coexist with the optimistic expectation of decentralization (H1). The expected outcomes of decentralization in NRM are seldom realized because democratic decentralization is hardly implemented [1][2][14][1,2,23]. Moreover, under the so-called participatory management arrangement, changes in the rights and powers to manage the resources are skewed in favor of customary authorities and the gold committee, which partially fulfil the conditions that would enable improved social, economic, and environmental sustainability results in the entrenched “bossism” and social inequality [4]. Like concerns raised by critical observers of decentralization in some parts of the world, “this raises important concerns over elite capture of the decentralization process” [4] (p. 450). This confirms our initial suspicion that the null hypothesis cannot fully capture the processes at play. We recall that the decentralization of procedures in ASM leads to actors repositioning strategies, which ultimately has a negative impact on social, economic, and ecological sustainability. H2 postulates that the following mechanisms contribute to explain the actors’ repositioning strategies.
We show how economic factors (e.g., rents, gold price), political factors (e.g., selective decentralization, vote), and bargaining power relations influence national government officials not to let their responsibilities go to local people for them to progressively expand their control over the mining sector, which gradually falls prey to corruption and resource mismanagement. The centralist system of NRM in successive postcolonial governments, which resulted in the enactment of new pieces of legislations, including PNDCL 218 in 1989 and Act 703 in 2006, is influenced by the British colonial administration that lay the foundation for a centralized system, vesting ownership of all mineral resource wealth whether in public or private land to the colonial state [21][22][28,33].
Since 2006, attempts by central government authorities seem to roll back local people’s participation and control of mineral resource exploitation amidst Act 462. The empirical case study results show that central government authorities implemented selective decentralization on grounds of so-called sustainable management, contrary to observations in other sectors, such as local governance [23], education [24], sustainable urban development [25], and environmental management [26]. In the Ghanaian case of NRM for ASM, selective decentralization only worked in limited sustainable management practices at local levels. MMDAs are not allowed to grant licenses to miners at the local level, and the establishment of a district level MC to perform a critical formalization role at the local level is intentionally delayed, resulting in poor implementation of sustainable mining practices and a poor capacity to monitor detrimental ASM practices. The study indicate that central government authorities aim to sustain a neopatrimonial relationship for the extraction of various rents and fees and to reward political party supporters in return for votes.
Like the PNDCL 218, Act 703 also turned out to be unsuccessful as an instrument for ASM formalization because very few ASM operations have been approved by the Minister to operate, while most informal ASM takes place inside the concessions of mining rights holders, often without their official consent, resulting in local conflicts [4]. The selective implementation of decentralization contributes to miners’ lack of access to information, leading to nepotism; rent-seeking during the distribution of licenses, leases, or permits; complexity; and the high cost of registration procedures [4][5]. In many mining communities, the central government’s bypassing of the assembly to fight against informal ASM in its territory suggests ambiguity regarding rule interpretation (e.g., Act 462 and Act 703) and enforcement. The central government’s weak mechanism of stopping informal ASM through a militarized taskforce failed to defuse ASM operation in the communities [10].
The newcomers’ huge rush for customary land for gold ore mining from 2008 onward due to their financial and political capital, which helps them to gain exclusive rights of access often guaranteed by the state, results in vulnerable and disenfranchised people who are on the losing end of the equation, increasingly bereft of meaningful access to CPR [4][11][10]. This leads to colossal local conflicts between resource users and owners, which are usually shaped by Indigeneity [9][27]. Indigenous identities are constructed in response to struggles over resources and can be seen as resistance identities formed as part of a legitimating narrative to assert preferential claims to resources and to resist dispossession [27]. The use of Indigeneity as a basis for territorial claims implies that locals have been exposed to international discourses and are able to articulate their identity in a way that is recognizable and usable by their advocates [27][24].
The study result supports Gerber and Haller’s [5] argument that the bargaining power of local groups and their capacity to self-organize for a collective action depends to a large extent on the perceived benefits and loss of the resource. For example, the perceived losses of ground rents to tindanas due to the local chief’s bypassing them to grant lease rights have led to the formation of the union of tindanas to resist their marginalization by referring to the ancestral domain and constitutions (institution shopping).
Our paper has intended to contribute to broader debates on the relationship among decentralization in NRM, the formalization of mining rights, and sustainability. We relied on a combination of political ecology and new institutionalism to direct central attention to the ways in which power and resources are distributed across society. The added value of this analytical approach is its ability to capture both the institutional and practical complexities in the implementation of decentralization in the Ghanaian ASM sector and its effects at the local level, which enables us to produce a set of more context-specific narratives. Our case study results show that Act 462, which aims to decentralize control over mineral resource wealth to the local population, coexists uneasily with the minerals and mining Act 703, which forms the basis for the formalization of mining rights [4]. This causes institutional ambiguities wherein different actors are now making claims to mineral resource wealth, leading to intragovernment conflicts over law interpretation and enforcement, conflicts between locals and newcomers, conflicts between informal miners and concession holders over access to above- and underground mineral resource wealth, and conflicts among customary authorities (chiefs and tindanas) seeking to secure ancestral domain rights and the associated royalties.
Despite the conflicts, decentralization has improved a selected few local actors’ access to mineral resource wealth and threatened the majority with dispossession, leading to social, economic, and environmental sustainability challenges. We argue that the Ghanaian national government tends to undervalue the threats of sustainable development as a constitutional objective resulting from the selective implementation of decentralization. Since local government actors are disempowered, and the state taskforce cannot be everywhere to monitor and supervise local resource exploiters, environmental degradation continues relentlessly.