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Safety Management in Industrial Corporation
Safety management in industrial corporation's most relevant factors are related to leadership and high standard safety culture, as well as additional attributes, such as awareness and process risk assessment, knowledge and competencies, proper communication and information, effective decision-making, and resilience.
2. Identification of Factors Necessary to Effectively Manage Process Safety in a Corporation
Designing the safety foundations of safety by delineating general, establishing safety principles and organizing the system by allocating authorizations and responsibilities.
Delivering and mastering safety by developing and empowering appropriate management procedures.
Checking and evaluating the system performance through audits and check-ups to double-check the attainment of goals adopted for the safety policy and introducing adjustments.
|10 July 1976||Seveso||Chemical||-||Human error, lack of
|2 December 1984||Bhopal||Chemical||8000
|Process safety and ageing
|26 April 1986||Chernobyl||Nuclear power plant||985,000||Human error in design
Absence of proof tests
|28 January 1986||Challenger space shuttle||Space||7||Organization failure
Pressure on success
|6 July 1988||Piper Alpha Platform||Gas and oil||167||Management of change
|3 October 1989||Philips, Texas||Chemical||23||Human error|||
|13 May 2000||Enschede, The Netherlands||Manufacturing||22||Lack of operational
|21 September 2001||Toulouse||Chemical||30||Lack of knowledge
Poor hazard identification
|23 March 2005||Texas City||Oil and gas||15||Failures in corporate
management and culture
|20 April 2010||Mexican Bay
|Oil and gas||11||Lack of supervision|||
|17 April 2013||West, Texas||Logistics||15||Lack of risk awareness|||
|12 August 2015||Tianjin,
|Logistics||173||Failures in management system|||
|22 March 2018||Kralupy,
|6||Human error and lack of
|29 October 2018
10 March 2019
Production and profit
pressure. Gaps in risk
|4 August 2020||Beirut port
|Storage||204||Lack of risk awareness
Poor process safety
|1||Absent or poor leadership of the corporate management in safety|
|2||Shortcomings, or rather negative safety culture and climate (infringing procedures, inability to learn, cost cuts and a system of awards related with it, weaknesses in the safety assessment resulting from compliance assessment, not risk assessment)|
|3||Inadequate organizational structure and unspecified scope of management competence and responsibility in the area of safety|
|4||Insufficient knowledge and experience of leaders and no support to production managers|
|5||Underestimated need to assess safety|
|6||Absence of monitoring and Board’s supervision over advances made in process safety|
|7||Attention paid mainly to occupational safety and safety indicators (IIR)|
The entry is from 10.3390/su13169001
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